gianni morandi in tour 2023

Tour Estate 2023

GO GIANNI GO! ESTATE 2023, la tournée prodotta da Trident Music e in partenza a luglio, vedrà Gianni Morandi impegnato tutta l’estate con numerosi appuntamenti a cielo aperto nelle più suggestive venue d’Italia.

  6 LUGLIO 2023 | SENIGALLIA @ PIAZZA GARIBALDI   8 LUGLIO 2023 | CODROIPO (UD) @ VILLA MANIN 10 LUGLIO 2023 | BRESCIA @ ARENA CAMPO MARTE 12 LUGLIO 2023 | PARMA @ PARCO DUCALE 14 LUGLIO 2023 | LA SPEZIA @ PIAZZA EUROPA 20 LUGLIO 2023 | FERRARA @ PIAZZA TRENTO E TRIESTE 22 LUGLIO 2023 | PIAZZOLA (PD) @ ANFITEATRO CAMERINI 25 LUGLIO 2023 | MATERA @ CAVA DEL SOLE 30 LUGLIO 2023 | ALGHERO @ ANFITEATRO IVAN GRAZIANI   2 AGOSTO 2023 | CASTELNUOVO DI GARFAGNANA (LU) @ FORTEZZA MONT’ALFONSO   8 AGOSTO 2023 | AGRIGENTO @ TEATRO VALLE DEI TEMPLI 10 AGOSTO 2023 | TAORMINA @ TEATRO ANTICO DI TAORMINA 12 AGOSTO 2023 | MALTA @ FORT MANOEL 16 AGOSTO 2023 | ISOLA CAPO RIZZUTO (KR) @ PORTO TURISTICO LE CASTELLA 18 AGOSTO 2023 | GIULIANOVA (TE) @ PORTO TURISTICO 20 AGOSTO 2023 | BAIA DOMIZIA (CE) @ ARENA DEI PINI 28 AGOSTO 2023 | BENEVENTO @ PIAZZA RISORGIMENTO    (nuova data)   2 SETTEMBRE 2023 | MANTOVA @ ESEDRA DI PALAZZO TE

Anche per la leg estiva Morandi ha pensato a una speciale scaletta, che mescola i grandi classici del suo repertorio alle tracce incluse nel nuovo progetto discografico EVVIVA! (Epic Records/Sony Music Italy), tra cui i brani frutto del fortunato sodalizio artistico con Jovanotti - L’Allegria, Apri Tutte Le Porte e Anna della porta accanto. Acclamato da un pubblico multigenerazionale, l’Eterno Ragazzo è pronto ad animare la calda stagione dei live regalando ancora una volta uno show ricco di emozioni indimenticabili.

I biglietti del GO GIANNI GO! ESTATE 2023 sono disponibili sui circuiti Ticketone e Ticketmaster.

Radio Italia è media partner ufficiale del tour. SUBARU è main partner. ZEUS SPORT è sponsor tecnico del tour.

Gli iscritti al MorandiMania Fan Club che lo vorranno, potranno, da lunedi' 3 aprile 2023, fino ad esaurimento, prenotare e quindi acquistare i biglietti per i live 2023 di Gianni Morandi in tutte le citta' annunciate, posizionati solo entro le prime 5 file di prima platea numerata, direttamente da noi, inviando una mail a [email protected] (non saranno prese in considerazione richieste su altri indirizzi mail ne' su messanger o sms, quindi non prenotate rispondendo a questa mail ma utilizzate solo l'indirizzo indicato), in cui specificheranno 1 - LA DATA 2 - LA CITTA' 3 - IL NUMERO DEI BIGLIETTI RICHIESTI 4 - TUTTI I NOMINATIVI DEGLI ACQUIRENTI 5 - NUMERO DI TESSERA 2023 Si ricorda che i nostri biglietti saranno riservati esclusivamente ai possessori di tessera, se non lo fossero, coloro che prenoteranno, sin da ora, si impegneranno a sottoscrivere l'iscrizione contestualmente al pagamento dei biglietti, mentre gli iscritti 2022 che acquistano i biglietti si impegnano a stipulare l'iscrizione a partire dal prossimo gennaio 2023 . Non e' possibile acquistare da noi biglietti per accompagnatori non iscritti . Entro 24 ore dalla prenotazione, all'indirizzo mail specificato, si riceverà conferma e, successivamente, modalità e data ultima di acquisto.

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Gianni Morandi: tutto su biglietti e concerti del tour GO GIANNI GO! – Morandi nei Palasport nel 2023

Gianni Morandi, al fianco di Amadeus come conduttore di Sanremo 2023, fa tornare il sole nelle nostre case e nelle nostre vite con l’annuncio del nuovo tour GO GIANNI GO! - Morandi nei Palasport d’Italia nel 2023. Biglietti ufficiali per le nuove date di Gianni Morandi ad Ancona, Bari ed Eboli in vendita da giovedì 17 novembre su Ticketmaster.it.

Biglietti ufficiali

Terzo classificato al Festival di Sanremo 2022 e Premio della Sala Stampa Lucio Dalla con Apri tutte le porte , primo posto nella gara delle cover di Sanremo insieme a Jovanotti con un medley dei loro più grandi successi da  Occhi di ragazza  a  Penso Positivo , special guest del Jova Beach Party e conduttore di Sanremo 2023 accanto ad Amadeus, c’è qualcuno che sta andando più forte dell’Eterno Ragazzo?

Partendo dal 10 marzo e dal Palasport di Rimini , Gianni Morandi aprirà le porte dei principali palazzi dello sport italiani per il nuovo tour nel 2023, la nuova avvincente corsa per raggiungere e riabbracciare il suo affezionato pubblico. Vai così, vai così, vai così, vai così ai concerti del GO GIANNI GO! – Morandi nei Palasport nel 2023 :

Gianni Morandi tour GO GIANNI GO! – Morandi nei Palasport 2023

• 10/03/2023, Stadium Rimini, Rimini
• 12/03/2023, Mediolanum Forum di Assago, Milano
• 15/03/2023, Mandela Forum, Firenze
• 18/03/2023, Palazzo dello Sport, Roma
• 21/03/2023, Unipol Arena, Bologna
• 23/03/2023, Pala Alpitour, Torino
• 25/03/2022, Palaprometeo, Ancona
• 28/03/2023, Palaflorio, Bari
• 30/03/2023, Palasele, Eboli

Biglietti per le nuove date di Ancona, Bari ed Eboli in vendita da giovedì 17 novembre alle 14:00

Lo showman in grado di tenere alta la carica di energia e il suo contagioso entusiasmo per l’intera durata dei suoi concerti ha studiato una speciale scaletta, un concentrato di vitalità e potenza che mescola i brani frutto del fortunato sodalizio artistico con Jovanotti – L’Allegria, Apri Tutte Le Porte e La Ola – ai classici del suo repertorio, affiancato sul palco da una formidabile band di 12 elementi diretta dal Maestro Luca Colombo.

Gianni Morandi e il rapporto speciale con Sanremo

Ricordiamo che Gianni Morandi era ancora un ragazzino quando partecipò per la prima volta al Festival di Sanremo nel 1972 e la sua canzone era questa qua: Vado a lavorare . Dalla sua prima apparizione a Sanremo che gli valse il quarto posto, il cantante di Monghidoro ha preso parte altre 9 volte al Festival della Canzone Italiana, sia come Big in gara a Sanremo che ospite e conduttore , per un totale di 10 partecipazioni all’attivo:

• Nel 1980 Mariù ha segnato il ritorno sulle scene di Gianni Morandi;
• Nel 1983 La mia nemica amatissima , brano scritto da Morandi insieme a Mogol e Bella, è giunto all’ottavo posto;
• In trio con Umberto Tozzi ed Enrico Ruggeri Gianni Morandi ha vinto il Festival di Sanremo nel 1987 con Si può dare di più ;
• Nel 1995 la coppia Gianni Morandi – Barbara Cola si è classificata al secondo posto con In Amore ;
• Dopo aver cantanto Vita e Lasciarsi per amore in qualità di ospite della kermesse canora, nel 2000 Morandi è salito sul terzo gradino del podio con una canzone composta da Eros Ramazzotti, Innamorato ;
• Nel 2011 e nel 2012, Gianni Morandi è stato il padrone di casa dell’Ariston, accompagnato rispettivamente da Luca Bizzarri, Paolo Kessisoglu, Belén Rodriguez ed Elisabetta Canalis per il suo esordio come conduttore e da Rocco Papaleo e modella Ivana Mrazova per il suo bis alla conduzione.

Dagli occhi lucidi della prima serata di Sanremo 2022 alla vittoria di Gianni Morandi nella serate delle cover, i migliori momenti del Festival di Sanremo nel nostro recap della scorsa edizione .

Piazzatosi al terzo posto con Apri tutte le porte , brano scritto per lui da Jovanotti , Gianni Morandi smetterà i panni da concorrente per indossare lo smoking del co-conduttore a Sanremo 2023 . La storia della musica, della televisione, ma è anche il presente perché è amato da intere generazioni, Gianni Morandi darà di certo ancora di più come presenza fissa del Festival di Sanremo 2023 dal 7 all’11 febbraio accanto al direttore artistico e conduttore Amadeus :

Caro Amadeus, non sono con Jovanotti. Mi sono messo lo smoking perché devo dirti che la proposta che mi hai fatto qualche giorno fa mi ha prima sorpreso e poi entusiasmato. Sai quanto io amo Sanremo. Poi mi sono fatto una domanda e ho pensato: ma come mai Amadeus mi vuole vicino? Ho pensato che hai fatto tre Festival straordinari, di grandi successi, ma anche molto impegnativi, faticosi. Tu nel 2023 avrai già compiuto 60 anni e quindi hai bisogno di qualcuno che ti dia una mano forte, energica, giovane e quindi hai chiamato me. Dai scherzo, accetto con entusiasmo!

Tutte le anticipazioni su date, concorrenti e ospiti del Festival di Sanremo nella nostra guida ufficiale .

Tour gianni go – morandi nei palasport nel 2023: tutto quello che devi sapere sui biglietti ufficiali dei concerti di gianni morandi.

I biglietti ufficiali per le nuove date di Gianni Morandi ad Ancona, Bari ed Eboli andranno in vendita alle 14:00 di giovedì 17 novembre 2022 su Ticketmaster.it .  

Devi contare solo sui nostri consigli Master per prepararti al meglio all’acquisto dei biglietti ufficiali dei concerti di Gianni Morandi:

• Crea subito il tuo account su Ticketmaster.it compilando tutti i campi obbligatori
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Vai così, vai così, vai così, vai così ai concerti del GO GIANNI GO! – Morandi nei Palasport nel 2023, acquista ora i biglietti ufficiali di Gianni Morandi !

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Tutti i dettagli dei nuovi concerti del cantautore

La nuova stagione live di una delle nuove voci più amate del nostro panorama discografico, quella di Gianni Morandi , ha per scenario i palazzetti dello sport maggiori del nostro Paese. Dopo l’ultima esperienza sul palco del Teatro Ariston del Festival di Sanremo 2023 nelle vesti di co-conduttore, il cantautore bolognese ritorna ad esibirsi in questo 2023 in tutt’Italia.

Lo spettacolo offrirà a Gianni Morandi l’opportunità di tornare a suonare nei maggiori palazzetti dello sport italiani ed in una speciale versione tutti i suoi brani in scaletta realizzando un tour davvero imperdibile. Non mancherà l’inserimento in scaletta di qualche sorpresa, ospite ed effetto speciale.

• 10 marzo 2023 – RIMINI – Stadium Rimini
• 12 marzo 2023 – MILANO – Mediolanum Forum
• 15 marzo 2023 – FIRENZE – Nelson Mandela Forum
• 18 marzo 2023 – ROMA – Palazzo dello Sport
• 21 marzo 2023 – BOLOGNA – Unipol Arena
• 23 marzo 2023 – TORINO – Pala Alpitour
• 25 marzo 2023 – ANCONA – Palaprometeo
• 28 marzo 2023 – BARI – Palaflorio
• 30 marzo 2023 – EBOLI – Palasele
• L’allegria
• Se perdo anche te
• Una vita che ti sogno
• Occhi di ragazza
• Bella signora
• Se non avessi più te
• Anna della porta accanto
• Canzoni stonate / Chimera / Il giocatto / Non son degno di te / La fisarmonica / Il mondo cambierà
• C’era un ragazzo come me che amava i Beatles e i Rolling Stones
• Un milione di piccole tempeste
• Apri tutte le porte
• Grazie perchè
• Se puoi uscire una domenica sola con me
• Andavo a 100 all’ora
• Fatti rimandare dalla mamma a prendere il latte
• In ginocchio da te
• Uno su mille
• Scende la pioggia
• Si può dare di più
• Banane e lamponi

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• Morandi, Gianni
• July 8, 2023 Setlist

Gianni Morandi Setlist at Villa Manin, Codroipo, Italy

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Tour: Go Gianni Go! Estate 2023 Tour statistics Add setlist

• L'allegria Play Video
• Se perdo anche te Play Video
• Una vita che ti sogno Play Video
• Varietà Play Video
• Occhi di ragazza Play Video
• Che meraviglia sei Play Video
• In amore ( duet with Silvia ) Play Video
• Bella signora Play Video
• Se non avessi più te Play Video
• Vita ( Lucio Dalla & Gianni Morandi  cover) ( duet with Roberto ) Play Video
• Futura ( Lucio Dalla  cover) ( snippet ) Play Video
• Caruso ( Lucio Dalla  cover) Play Video
• Evviva! Play Video
• Un mondo d'amore Play Video
• Canzoni stonate / Chimera / Il giocattolo / La fisarmonica / Non son degno di te / Il mondo cambierà ( acoustic medley ) Play Video
• C'era un ragazzo che come me amava i Beatles e i Rolling Stones ( Mauro Lusini  cover) Play Video
• Apri tutte le porte Play Video
• Grazie perché ( duet with Alessandra ) Play Video
• Se puoi uscire una domenica sola con me / Andavo a cento all'ora / Go-Kart Twist / Belinda ( '60s medley ) Play Video
• Fatti mandare dalla mamma a prendere il latte Play Video
• In ginocchio da te Play Video
• Uno su mille Play Video
• Scende la pioggia Play Video
• Si può dare di più ( Umberto Tozzi & Raf  cover) Play Video
• Banane e lampone Play Video

Edits and Comments

6 activities (last edit by [deleted user] , 20 Jul 2023, 23:54 Etc/UTC )

Songs on Albums

• C'era un ragazzo che come me amava i Beatles e i Rolling Stones by Mauro Lusini
• Caruso by Lucio Dalla
• Futura by Lucio Dalla
• Si può dare di più by Umberto Tozzi & Raf
• Vita by Lucio Dalla & Gianni Morandi
• Evviva! (2)
• Apri tutte le porte
• L'allegria
• Che meraviglia sei
• Una vita che ti sogno
• Se perdo anche te
• Un mondo d'amore
• Banane e lampone
• Grazie perché
• Bella signora
• Canzoni stonate / Chimera / Il giocattolo / La fisarmonica / Non son degno di te / Il mondo cambierà
• Se puoi uscire una domenica sola con me / Andavo a cento all'ora / Go-Kart Twist / Belinda
• Occhi di ragazza
• Fatti mandare dalla mamma a prendere il latte
• Se non avessi più te
• In ginocchio da te
• Scende la pioggia
• Uno su mille

Complete Album stats

Gianni Morandi

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Gianni Morandi Gig Timeline

• Mar 12 2023 Mediolanum Forum di Assago Assago, Italy Add time Add time
• Jun 24 2023 Italia Loves Romagna 2023 Reggio nell'Emilia, Italy Start time: 10:55 PM 10:55 PM
• Jul 08 2023 Villa Manin This Setlist Codroipo, Italy Start time: 9:10 PM 9:10 PM
• Jul 12 2023 Parco Ducale Parma, Italy Add time Add time
• Jul 25 2023 Sonic Park Matera 2023 Matera, Italy Add time Add time

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<div style="text-align: center;" class="setlistImage"><a href="https://www.setlist.fm/setlist/gianni-morandi/2023/villa-manin-codroipo-italy-73a72611.html" title="Gianni Morandi Setlist Villa Manin, Codroipo, Italy, Go Gianni Go! Estate 2023" target="_blank"><img src="https://www.setlist.fm/widgets/setlist-image-v1?id=73a72611" alt="Gianni Morandi Setlist Villa Manin, Codroipo, Italy, Go Gianni Go! Estate 2023" style="border: 0;" /></a> <div><a href="https://www.setlist.fm/edit?setlist=73a72611&amp;step=song">Edit this setlist</a> | <a href="https://www.setlist.fm/setlists/gianni-morandi-23d6c037.html">More Gianni Morandi setlists</a></div></div>

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[url=https://www.setlist.fm/setlist/gianni-morandi/2023/villa-manin-codroipo-italy-73a72611.html][img]https://www.setlist.fm/widgets/setlist-image-v1?id=73a72611[/img][/url] [url=https://www.setlist.fm/edit?setlist=73a72611&amp;step=song]Edit this setlist[/url] | [url=https://www.setlist.fm/setlists/gianni-morandi-23d6c037.html]More Gianni Morandi setlists[/url]

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Gianni Morandi in concerto, tutte le date del tour estivo 2023

La prima data sarà a Senigallia il 6 luglio mentre il gran finale è previsto il 2 settembre a Mantova

Iscriviti alla nostra newsletter per restare aggiornato sulle notizie di spettacolo A meno di 24 ore dall’ultimo show del GO GIANNI GO! MORANDI NEI PALASPORT, che ha animato tutto il mese di marzo a suon di musica e sold out, Gianni Morandi annuncia oggi i primi appuntamenti estivi:  GO GIANNI GO! ESTATE 2023 , la tournée prodotta da  Trident Music  e in partenza a luglio, lo vedrà impegnato tutta l’estate con numerosi appuntamenti a cielo aperto nelle più suggestive venue d’Italia.

Ad inaugurare il tour estivo sarà l’appuntamento a  Senigallia  (6 luglio @ Piazza Garibaldi), a cui seguiranno le date di  Codroipo - UD  (8 luglio @ Villa Manin),  Brescia  (10 luglio @ Arena Campo Marte),  Parma  (12 luglio @ Parco Ducale),  La Spezia  (14 luglio @ Piazza Europa),  Ferrara  (20 luglio @ Piazza Trento e Trieste),  Piazzola - PD  (22 luglio @ Anfiteatro Camerini),  Matera  (25 luglio @ Cava del Sole),  Alghero  (30 luglio @ Anfiteatro Ivan Graziani),  Castelnuovo di Garfagnana  (2 agosto @ Fortezza Mont’Alfonso),  Agrigento  (8 agosto @ Teatro Valle dei Templi), Taormina (10 agosto @ Teatro Antico di Taormina),  Malta  (12 agosto @ Fort Manoel),  Isola Capo Rizzuto – KR  (16 agosto @ Porto Turistico Le Castella),  Giulianova   – TE  (18 agosto @ Porto Turistico),  Baia Domizia   – CE  (20 agosto @ Arena dei Pini),  Mantova  (2 settembre @ Esedra di Palazzo Te).

Anche per la leg estiva Morandi ha pensato a una speciale scaletta, che mescola i grandi classici del suo repertorio alle tracce incluse nel nuovo progetto discografico  EVVIVA!  ( Epic Records/Sony Music Italy ), tra cui i brani frutto del fortunato sodalizio artistico con  Jovanotti  -  L’Allegria, Apri Tutte Le Porte  e  Anna della porta accanto .  Acclamato da un pubblico multigenerazionale, l’Eterno Ragazzo è pronto ad animare la calda stagione dei live regalando ancora una volta uno show ricco di emozioni indimenticabili.  I  biglietti  del  GO GIANNI GO! ESTATE 2023  saranno disponibili a partire  dalle ore 14.00 di lunedì 3 aprile  sui circuiti  Ticketone  e  Ticketmaster .

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Gianni Morandi, Co-Host of Sanremo 2023, Discusses His Endless Passion for the Festival

The Italian pop music legend knows Sanremo from every angle: as a contestant, guest performer, host — but first as a fan. And he is Amadeus' sparring partner for this year's edition.

By Matteo Villaci

Matteo Villaci

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Gianni Morandi’s love for Sanremo shines through when he tells anecdotes from the past or shares reflections on the importance the festival has regained over the last few editions. That love became a real thing for the first time in 1972 with his debut at Sanremo as a contestant. That started a tight connection that is about to renew itself once again, after 51 years.

Amadeus Shares Secrets Behind Three Years of Directing Sanremo Music Festival

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You have participated in many editions of Sanremo in several different roles. The festival itself is different now. Amadeus’ touch is effective, starting from the selection of artists. How are you preparing for this new edition?

I’ve seen every single edition of Sanremo since 1958, when Domenico Modugno sang “Nel Blu Dipinto di Blu.” To me, Sanremo is a fantastic opportunity, a great stage. I like the fact that I became such a frequent presence here. Amadeus added something, for sure. He has a great knowledge of music and he’s also an innovator; he really opened the doors to new music trends. He’s a forward-looking kind of guy. The results of the last three editions prove it. What makes Sanremo great is the songs that stay — that people don’t forget and keep on singing. And in the last three years, the hits were many. Starting from Måneskin, who became a global success. They are extraordinary on their own, but they started from Sanremo. Amadeus greatly improved the festival. Now it’s also followed by a younger audience.

It’s also more in line with contemporary trends of Italian music, and it promotes artists that are not necessarily known by everyone. How do you see today’s music scene? Did you ever get to know an artist better because of Sanremo?

Sanremo saw you as a contestant, then as a host, then as a contestant again. Your last participation was just last year, and now you’re hosting the event. How did this transition happen?

I’ve always had a great feeling with Amadeus. We hosted a New Year’s Eve celebration together, back in 2020. We should have done it in Terni, but we ended up doing it in Rome in an empty studio where we stayed for five or six hours. He told me that he wanted me as a co-host last year, too. But then he saw that I submitted the song Jovanotti had written for me. So he didn’t expect me to participate as a contestant. This year, he just fulfilled a wish he expressed two years ago.

So much of your life and many of your hits are bound to Sanremo. What are some special memories?

Knowing them, it could have been both. But besides the songs, there’s the competition, which also paves the way to an international opportunity such as Eurovision. How much is that perceived by the artists? And what feelings do they share during that week?

Over those days you develop relations and see people you haven’t met for a long time. I think there is some sort of solidarity among the artists, even if the competition is still there. But they share a lot of things, and no one gets mad if they lose. If an artist hits that stage and sings a good song, the audience will notice it, regardless of the final ranking. Take Tananai, for example: He ranked last in 2022, but then he had a big success [with “Sesso Occasionale” (“Casual Sex”), which has 37 million streams on Spotify]. The audience knows how to pay you back.

What do you wish for this edition of Sanremo?

I hope to see at least 15 or 20 hit songs. That’s the success of Sanremo: when songs last for decades. Eros Ramazzotti’s “Una Storia Importante” (“An Important Story”) is almost 40 years old now. Amadeus selected a great lineup this year. There’s a bit of everything, even big comebacks such as Anna Oxa and Cugini di Campagna, but also new talents such as Olly, gIANMARIA, Madame and so many others who represent today’s music. Sanremo is shining again. It started with Claudio Baglioni [who was Sanremo’s artistic director in 2018 and 2019], but Amadeus brought it to the next level.

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GO GIANNI GO ESTATE 2023

Description:

Event Details

Event Type:

Manoel Island Triq il-Forti Manoel, Gzira

Start Date:

12 August 2023

Manoel Island

Triq il-Forti Manoel

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Il Volo Flight Crew ~Share The Love

Tag archives: gianni morandi.

AN INTERVIEW AND MORE NEWS by Daniela

There is always some news and something to write about il volo and so i will update you with the latest news., a nice audio interview has been published by the new classical radio, a station that is part of zoomer radio and broadcasts from canada. host mark wigmore talks to piero, gianluca (from milano) and ignazio (from venezuela) , but you can listen to everything because the interview is in english, at the beginning mark immediately mispronounces the names of gianluca and ignazio 😁😁, click here to listen to the interview, (if you are using a computer to listen to the interview, you can right click on the audio player line under the first photo and save the interview as an mp3 file to your computer 😀  see photo below).

Meanwhile Il Volo has published three concert dates in Germany and ticket sales are already active.

16 october = düsseldorf, 17 october = berlin, 19 october = frankfurt.

Barbara Vitali also posted this nice announcement:

We are happy that this beautiful special can be seen in Brazil!

Another piece of good news:

Italian opera singing is officially on the list of intangible cultural heritage of humanity: the proclamation took place on the occasion of the 18th session of the intergovernmental committee for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage of unesco in botswana., a beautiful result that confirms how important our opera tradition is, a tradition which unfortunately is now greatly underestimated here in italy if not even relegated to a few enthusiasts., the most popular italian music has nothing to do with opera nor with bel canto and little with pop..

You will surely have known that the Il Volo Christmas EP, which contains 4 Christmas songs, was put on sale in red vinyl format and signed by Piero, Ignazio and Gianluca.

I didn’t bring you the news here, because the vinyl couldn’t be ordered outside italy. but look how beautiful it is, needless to say, i ordered mine and it should arrive these days, so i’ll let you know my impression as soon as it arrives 😉, we finish this news with a roundup of photos of our favorites:, il volo in the recording room..

Piero with two famous Italian singers: Gianni Morandi and Antonello Venditti.

And how happy is Ignazio as he hugs his new girlfriend’s little cousin? ❤️

That’s all for now, but we’ll talk to you soon!!

Daniel a   🤗.

Credit to owners of all photos and the audio intervew by The New Classical Radio.

Come in and share the love of life, friends and Il Volo!

gianni morandi in tour

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Thursday 10 August 2023

GIANNI MORANDI - GO GIANNI GO ESTATE 2023

Teatro Antico - Taormina, Taormina, Italy

Line-up: Gianni Morandi

• Gianni Morandi

98039 Taormina, Italy

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Doors open: 21:30

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1890 - 1964.

MORANDI 1890 - 1964

Morandi 1890-1964 is an exhibition curated by Maria Cristina Bandera . Because of the quantity and quality of works on display, it is one of the most important and comprehensive retrospective exhibitions on the Bologna-born painter held in the last few decades. It perfectly falls in line with the deep appreciation for Morandi’s work in prestigious international venues, from the Metropolitan Museum in New York (2008), to the Pushkin in Moscow (2017), and the Guggenheim in Bilbao (2019).

More than thirty years since the last exhibition, Milan dedicates this major exhibition to Giorgio Morandi, to celebrate the elective relationship between the city and the Bologna-born painter.

Indeed, Morandi’s first major collectors – i.e. Vitali, Feroldi, Scheiwiller, Valdameri, De Angeli, Jesi, Jucker, Boschi Di Stefano, and Vismara, who have donated parts of their collections to the city – were from Lombardy or lived in Milan. Further, Galleria del Milione, with which the painter had a privileged relationship, was also based in Milan.

An exhibition corpus of about 120 works traces the entire oeuvre of the Bologna-born artist – fifty years of activity, from 1913 to 1963 – by means of outstanding loans from leading public institutions and prestigious private collections .

The exhibition follows a chronological order with targeted and unprecedented comparisons with other artists, documenting Morandi’s stylistic evolution and modus operandi. It features 34 sections narrating the various phases in the Maestro’s art.

closed on monday thuesday - sunday 10.00 - 19.30 thursday 10.00 - 22.30 last entrance 1 hour before closing time

Open ticket 17,00 euros Full price 15,00 euros Reduced price 13,00 euros excluded presale costs

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Commentary: The Global Jihadi Terror Threat in September 2024

September 2024, volume 17, issue 8.

Edmund Fitton-Brown

Categories:

• Counterterrorism
• Operations, Plots & Attacks
• Strategy, History, & Goals

The terrorist threat from jihadi groups was progressively degraded by counterterrorism measures after 9/11. The military defeat of the Islamic State ushered in a period from about 2017 of unusually low threat in non-conflict zones around the world, followed by some disinvestment from CT by Western governments. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Gaza war have seen a collapse of international unity of purpose on CT. Meanwhile, the underlying factors driving violent jihadi extremism are growing more acute, and the success of the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida in conflict zones is generating safe havens for them to revive their external operations capabilities. The global jihadi threat has already risen and is likely to increase further. Attacks should be expected in the West, and it would be a mistake for governments to disinvest further from CT.

As we pass yet another anniversary of 9/11, let us think back briefly to the eve of that watershed moment: In the 1990s, this author worked on counterterrorism issues in London, Cairo, and Kuwait. There was a lot going on: attacks on tourists in Egypt, the early days of what became al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. But international CT efforts were unsophisticated with objectives that were variable and not always clear. In those days, it was the norm (albeit infuriating) for one government to lie to another about in-country terrorist threats and hold back information except in the immediate aftermath of major attacks. State sponsorship of terrorism was also common in those days, and it was difficult to achieve international consensus on how to react in such cases. If all that sounds familiar, it is because we now find ourselves dealing with those same unpropitious circumstances. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and Hamas’ attack on Israel just under a year ago, international CT cooperation is the weakest it has been in 23 years.

9/11 was indeed a watershed moment, ushering in two decades of exceptional international cooperation on CT. It was an attack on a scale not seen before, with a huge strategic impact. With the Cold War apparently over, 9/11 brought salafi-jihadi-takfiri terrorism to the forefront as the most conspicuous international threat, one where there was little state sponsorship once the Taliban had been ejected from power in Afghanistan, and where there was a high level of international agreement on the need to tackle and suppress it. The Islamic State later refined the art of repelling the international community with its gleeful savagery. This explains the generally smooth working of the 1267 Committee of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), charged with sanctioning the authors of 9/11, al-Qa`ida, and later the Islamic State. a From 2018 to 2022, this author led the al-Qa`ida, ISIS, and Taliban Monitoring Team that supported that committee, and witnessed first-hand how strong the consensus on CT was, and then how it started to break down.

We seem in some ways to have gone through two distinct eras since 9/11 and now to be facing a third, and it is the nature of the global threat we now face that this piece examines. The threat during the decade or so after 9/11 came mainly from al-Qa`ida, and it saw many deadly attacks, especially in Europe. Then there was a period of Islamic State domination of the jihadi scene, with its own signature achievement that rivaled even the impact of 9/11: the establishment of a ‘caliphate’ in large parts of Iraq and Syria and the attraction of tens of thousands of extremists who migrated to become part of this experiment in extreme Islamist governance, with large numbers of them becoming foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) for the caliphate. The virulence of the Islamic State led to its defeat in Iraq in 2017 and in Syria in 2019 by international military CT forces.

By the end of the decade, the Islamic State had been forced to adapt to this reality by setting up regional networks of its provinces around the world, with this “global virtual caliphate” sustained by its heavy investment in online activity and propaganda. Meanwhile, after about 2017, with the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida both under intense CT pressure, the threat level from jihadi terrorism in the West and other non-conflict zones fell to its lowest level since the 1990s. The threat was further suppressed from March 2020 onward by the widespread shutdown caused by the pandemic, which made traveling and meeting for terrorist purposes even harder. The forces of CT seemed to have won and, just as we approached the 20th anniversary of 9/11, policymakers started to argue that scarce resources were needed to meet other strategic challenges. But fast forward to the present and CT professionals now warn of the risks from under-investment in CT at a time when the threat appears to be reviving.

So, what are the components of this reviving threat? Apart from the collapse of international consensus on CT and most other issues that were mentioned earlier, the key drivers in this author’s assessment include:

1. Global economic stress. This comprises the economic slowdown caused partly by COVID-19, along with other after-effects of the pandemic, but also the impacts of population growth, environmental issues such as climate change, and the reality and perception of widening global inequality of wealth and opportunity. There is latent anger in much of the developing world and also among large swathes of the populations of wealthier countries. Economic stress is a key driver of conflict and migration, which in some cases creates vulnerable communities who can be preyed upon by criminals and extremists, and in parallel feeds extremist narratives that tend to polarize and radicalize people, with potential CT consequences. If a pole of attraction for jihadi extremists analogous to the ‘caliphate’ arose today, it would likely mobilize large numbers of people from around the world.

2. Political and social stress and the impacts of social media, artificial intelligence, and disinformation. The anger and destructiveness of much political discourse in the West is aggravated by technology, and this makes it harder to combat extremist narratives that use disinformation to feed upon and accentuate political polarization. This undermines consensus around liberal democratic values that have traditionally reinforced law and order and opposition to political violence.

3. Diversion of CT resources onto other priorities. CT was probably over-resourced in the two decades following 9/11. It should never have been treated as more important than all the other goals, but now there is a risk of over-correction. The pandemic, environmental concerns, and geostrategic threats are all competing with CT for a share of shrinking official budgets.

4. The example of Afghanistan. Just as complacency set in among the general public about the CT battle, just as the 20th anniversary of 9/11 approached, the United States and NATO withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Taliban took back control of the country by force. The writing was on the wall from the moment President Trump agreed to the disastrous Doha agreement in February 2020. The Taliban takeover has placed the resources of a state in the hands of a group responsible for harboring terrorists. Explicitly internationally oriented terrorist groups are using Afghanistan as a safe haven; still others, like al-Shabaab in Somalia, have taken the Taliban’s triumph as an inspiration and an example to be emulated.

5. Poverty and polarization in Africa. Issues related to climate, over-population, corruption, crime, sectarian and inter-communal tensions and violence, and poor governance have severely hampered the emergence of developing economies in Africa from poverty and conflict. This has allowed the Islamic State, al-Qa`ida, and other violent extremist groups to grow dramatically in significance over the past decade in Africa, which also shows a worrying overlap between terrorism and organized crime.

6. Geostrategic rivalry at the expense of good governance and long-term security. Here, the collapse of international consensus, and especially the rivalry between the West and countries such as Russia that define themselves largely in opposition to Western values, feed directly into instability in the developing world, and especially in Africa. Online disaffection in and with the West is also a factor in this, undermining the credibility of European and North American states as mentors and partners. Weak jurisdictions in Africa have seen a series of military coups that have led to successive regimes that are ever more out of touch with the needs of their citizens, while militias and terrorist groups have seized the opportunity to present themselves as more responsive and more relevant. Lacking legitimacy and abandoning aspirations to good governance, coup regimes have increasingly turned to foreign mercenaries such as what used to be known as the Wagner Group b that offer a no-questions-asked enforcement service, taking money or resources to kill enemies of the state. But this does not offer lasting security; 1 it will ultimately fail and could enable terrorist groups to take over large swathes of territory and probably entire states—the Afghanization of the African Sahel.

7. The collapse of credibility of the United Nations. This follows on from the rejection of Western values and influence and the expulsion of European and North American CT forces and advisors. The United Nations has made the mistake of wholeheartedly embracing a Western progressive agenda that does not even command consensus in most Western countries. It has refused to cooperate fully with Iraq against the Islamic State because Iraq has the death penalty (and yet three of the five permanent members of the UNSC also have the death penalty). Aspects of its doctrine on governance and best practice are seen by developing countries as preachy and unrealistic, bringing to bear the preoccupations of Western liberals on societies that do not understand or accept them. The United Nations has been expelled from Mali, 2 and other countries are feeling increasingly emboldened to reject its tutelage. This accentuates the problem of juntas relying on foreign mercenaries for support. The United Nations, for all its faults, can offer important support to countries such as Mali, and the United Nations also has CT resources that can help build resilience.

8. Anger in the Islamic world at conflict in the Middle East. This has been a perennial feature in past surges of terrorist activity, but it has taken on a slightly different character since the Hamas attack on Israel last year and the consequent Israeli military campaign in Gaza. Al-Qa`ida was quick to recognize this as an opportunity to ride a wave of Muslim indignation, devoting much of its propaganda since to inspiring attacks on Israel and its allies. 3 Thus far, this has not had much practical success, but Western CT authorities assess that the jihadi terror threat has increased. 4

9. The aftermath of past conflicts and CT campaigns. This article has discussed Afghanistan, which continues to serve as an inspiration for Islamic extremists. But Syria, too, remains broken ever since the Arab Spring deteriorated into civil war, and there seems little hope of an inclusive political settlement that will allow for stabilization and regeneration. Meanwhile, the sore of the camps and prisons in northeastern Syria continues to fester. Their total population has probably been halved in the past five years, down to about 40,000, 5 but this is still far too many people, including many children, to be kept in limbo. Babies have grown into children, children into adolescents in conditions conducive to desperation, disillusionment, indoctrination, and radicalization. The true legacy of the ‘caliphate’ may only become apparent over the course of a generation, when we discover what proportion of its graduates (including those who have already returned to their countries of origin and may have completed prison sentences) resume or start some form of jihadi activity.

10. The revival of state sponsorship of terrorism, especially by Iran. This is a major development and ties in to some degree with the Gaza factor mentioned above. Here, we should take note of a fact quite well known but not yet sufficiently understood: that the presumed leader of al-Qa`ida, Saif al-`Adl, is hosted by Iranian intelligence in Tehran. 6 His predecessor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a U.S. drone in Kabul two years ago. Al-`Adl was already in Iran, with other members of the al-Qa`ida leadership, and he decided to stay. The impact of a leading salafi-jihadi terrorist group having the world’s leading Shi`a state as its protector has started to take effect. It started in Yemen, where al-`Adl’s son was (until his recent death) a key member of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 7 AQAP had previously been fighting against the Houthis, Iran’s local proxy, in the Yemeni civil war. Over the past couple of years, that fighting has stopped and the groups have deconflicted, even cooperated. 8 In the context of the conflict surrounding Israel at present, and the “Axis of Resistance” that Iran coordinates (including Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shi`a militias, and the Houthis), we may be on the verge of seeing a Sunni extremist-Shi`a extremist front emerging to fight Israel and the West. Of course, the Islamic State, which takes a much harder line in insisting that the Shi`a are kafirs and also rejects Islamist nationalism, will have nothing to do with this front.

Given these troubling circumstances that we now face, let us undertake a renewed tour d’horizon of the various arenas around the world in which salafi-jihadi groups pose or could come to pose a threat. To this end, this article will draw extensively on the latest report of the Monitoring Team (MT), published in July and covering the period January to June 2024. 9 This article will take the regions and issues in the same order in which the UN Monitoring Team addresses them but will also feature reflections, insight, analysis, and predictions of my own and will also illuminate these with examples from a much longer period of recent history.

Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa Starting with eastern, central, and southern Africa, an area that the Islamic State groups together in their regional organization, this has emerged as a major arena of jihadi violence over the past decade. Of course, Somalia has long been plagued with extremism, and al-Shabaab remains the single most capable affiliate of al-Qa`ida. Not only does al-Shabaab destabilize Somalia, but it threatens neighbors like Kenya. It is financially strong, remitting funds back to other parts of the al-Qa`ida network. 10 Alarmingly, from a threat projection perspective, it has a history of attracting FTFs and has taken an interest in civil aviation pilot training, as evidenced by a plot to launch a 9/11-style attack in the United States thwarted in 2019. 11 Somalia depends on regional and wider assistance to fend off the threat from al-Shabaab, which is resilient enough to bide its time until international partners lose patience and leave.

The Islamic State has accepted pledges of allegiance from local jihadi groups in Mozambique (Ahl ul Sunna Wal Jam’a – ASWJ) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Allied Democratic Forces – ADF). These now fit within an Islamic State regional structure, Islamic State Central Africa Province or ISCAP, that is coordinated from Somalia by the Al-Karrar office (AKO). 12 The AKO is one of five important offices of the Islamic State General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) that became key to sustaining the Islamic State after its defeat in Iraq and Syria. 13 The others are Iraq province, Syria province, the Khorasan region in Asia (the al-Siddiq office – ASO), 14 and the western and northern Africa region (the al-Furqan office – AFO). 15

AKO is headed by Abdulqadir Mumin, who split from al-Shabaab to form Islamic State-Somalia, of which he is also the chief. 16 Although much smaller than al-Shabaab, hosting AKO gives Islamic State-Somalia strategic importance, especially with regard to Islamic State finance. 17 AKO’s ability to move money extends outside ISCAP and has become key to funding the Islamic State elsewhere in Africa and even as far afield as Afghanistan. U.S. special operations forces successfully launched an operation in January 2023 to remove Mumin’s deputy, Bilal al-Sudani, from the battlefield and reportedly tried to kill Mumin earlier this year. 18 But AKO continues to grow in importance, to the point where Mumin is now widely reported to have taken over either as chief of the entire GDP, 19 or even as the global “caliph” of the Islamic State. 20

What this signifies in threat terms is growing violence and instability in a range of countries, including Mozambique, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Sudan. With increasing numbers of FTFs, mainly from the region, drawn to Somalia, Mozambique, and DRC, this will likely spread to other countries. But the threat is unlikely to be projected beyond these African conflict zones in the near future. That said, the principal human factor in the success of AKO, the Somali diaspora, extends widely in Africa and throughout the world. It is Somali hawaladars and expatriates that make AKO such an effective network and that could rapidly transform into an active threat facilitated or carried out by Somalis in the West.

Western and Northern Africa Western and northern Africa are also grouped together by the Islamic State, with the AFO being rewarded for its effectiveness and success by being given responsibility beyond its original Lake Chad Basin arena. First, the area considered part of Islamic State-West Africa Province or ISWAP was extended to include the western Sahel and Islamic State-Greater Sahara or ISGS; then the GDP office in Libya was mothballed and AFO took on oversight of North Africa as well. This was driven partly by ISWAP operational prowess, where Nigerian forces have been unable to suppress it in large swathes of northeastern Nigeria and it has been able to pose a cross-border threat into Chad and eastern Niger. ISGS, in turn, once it managed to deconflict with the local al-Qa`ida affiliate, became increasingly effective in the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso, and western Niger. It will be interesting to see whether AFO tutelage sees a revival of the largely quiescent Islamic State cells in North Africa, but for now, as in the other half of Africa, the threat is not projected outside the region.

However, the trajectory of the jihadi threat in West Africa and the western Sahel should still alarm us. The most instructive group to study here is the local al-Qa`ida-affiliated coalition, Jam’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which has grown steadily in power and reach in recent years. It is a measure of how effective CT measures have been in North Africa that one component of JNIM, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, has been marginalized in Algeria but is part of an effort further south that threatens to collapse fragile jurisdictions in the Sahel. JNIM was originally centred mainly on Mali, and it continues to challenge the authorities there, but its growth has been more striking in Burkina Faso, 21 while it also projects influence now across the Malian and Burkinabe borders into Niger, Togo, Benin, Senegal, and potentially also northwestern Nigeria. 22

The politics of Mali and Burkina Faso are increasingly fraught, with military coups undermining the legitimacy of Bamako and Ouagadougou. The military regimes’ decisions (and the parallel decision of Niger) to abandon their reliance on the United Nations and the West, and to accept the less complicated demands of Wagner, Russia, and Iran, run the risk of accelerating the polarization and radicalization of their populations, while JNIM is shrewd enough to recognize this and present itself as more responsive to the needs of citizens than their governments. Two worst-case scenarios could flow from this: locally, in Nigeria, a contagion of organized extremism in the northwest could effectively link the Lake Chad Basin and western Sahel theaters; and regionally, if Mali, Burkina Faso, and/or Niger collapse as effective jurisdictions, we could see an Afghanization of the Sahel that creates a new pole of attraction for FTFs and incubates an external threat capability that projects into North Africa and across the sea to Europe.

The Middle East Moving to the Middle East, there are many causes for concern in the Levant, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Regarding the last-mentioned, there is some good news in that all of the GCC countries seem more stable and better organized to meet contemporary challenges than in the past. Some, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are even confident enough to project influence that may prove valuable in easing conflict elsewhere in the region. The Saudis are certainly trying to promote a peaceful outcome in Yemen, although it can be argued that Houthi aggression in the Red Sea suggests they cannot safely be allowed to dominate Yemen more than they do already.

Yemen itself remains highly problematic, a fragmented, failed state that incubates terrorist groups like the Houthis and AQAP and projects threat within the neighborhood and (in the case of AQAP) retains global threat aspirations. The Islamic State is notably weak and generally despised in Yemen, but the impact of deconfliction and potential partnership between the Houthis and AQAP could be serious. Saif al-`Adl’s bowing to the agenda of his Iranian hosts and driving a deconfliction between Iran and al-Qa`ida, even to the point of positioning al-Qa`ida as part of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, is playing out interestingly in Yemen. 23

The deaths of al-`Adl’s son and of AQAP leader Khaled Batarfi in early 2024 24 have not been satisfactorily explained and, if they were not just a coincidence of one illness and one accident, could possibly have resulted from a power struggle within AQAP over this strategic direction. The Houthis have much Yemeni Sunni blood on their hands, and not everyone in AQAP is likely to be ready to forgive them. It will be important to see how the new chief, Saad ben Atef al-Awlaqi, positions the group. Batarfi was a Saudi national, and it may be that al-Awlaqi, a Yemeni, will be more viscerally hostile to the Houthis.

The Levantine and Iraqi heartland of the Islamic State is more complex than the Peninsula. Here, the Islamic State remains the most embedded jihadi group, and its unbending hostility to all other ideologies, and especially toward Iran and the Shi`a, creates a complicated threat landscape. One of the risks inherent in Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to sever its CT relationship with the United States is that the Islamic State retains strong support in northern and western Iraq and has not forgotten that Iraqi forces were no match for it when it surged to create the ‘caliphate’ last decade. If Baghdad can maintain its balancing act between Tehran and Washington, and balance Kurdish, Arab Sunni, Arab Shi`a, and minority sect interests inside Iraq, the Islamic State can be held in check. It has not been able to carry out strategically significant attacks in Iraq in recent years. But if Baghdad lurches toward Iran and Shi`a sectarian interests, the Islamic State will likely resurge.

The prognosis in Syria is worse than in Iraq, as Syrian demographics argue conclusively against the revival of the fragile national consensus that Hafez al-Assad built around Alawite rule that guaranteed the rights of minorities against the large Arab Sunni majority. The Arab Spring and subsequent civil war have fractured inter-communal relations to the point where Sunni extremists such as the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Hurras al-Din, and the many foreign extremist groups and fighters are prepared to hold out despite enduring hardship and brutality at the hands of Bashar al-Assad and his Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah allies. They will likely be able to find safe haven for a long time among an alienated population. With no political solution in sight, no prospect of stabilization and reconstruction, they will likely hold out for a Sunni victory, however many years or decades that takes. This is why HTS has proved so difficult to defeat in the northwest and why the Islamic State remains a threat despite the best CT efforts of their opponents. When it comes to the camps in northeastern Syria containing Islamic State detainees, there is a constant risk of jailbreak-type operations and long-term radicalization and training risk. From the perspective of international CT, there is a need to watch carefully for the incubation of a new threat projection capability in Syria, either by the Islamic State or the al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups.

Other jurisdictions in the Levant are also affected by conflict and increasingly tense in the context of the Gaza war and the Iranian-orchestrated campaign against Israel and the West. Even Jordan, a relatively stable country with robust policy orientation, finds Palestinian anger, the proximity of Iraq, the subversive activities of Iran, and the abuse of its airspace by those directing projectiles at Israel very challenging. Lebanon is all but a failed state, held hostage by Hezbollah, and suffering like Syria and Iraq from disillusioned, extremist Sunnis and displaced persons, some radicalized. There is a possibility of violence from various quarters in all of the countries surrounding Israel and the Palestinian territories, and that could be at Iran’s behest or could equally be terrorism inspired by the Islamic State or al-Qa`ida propaganda.

Europe Inspiration derived from propaganda is also a concern in Europe including Russia, where the threat of jihadi violence is assessed as having increased since the Hamas attack on Israel last October. 25 This assessment is based largely on the perception of popular anger over Palestinian casualties and the reluctance of Western governments to break with Israel over this. Al-Qa`ida reacted adroitly to the attack, focusing its media on the importance of opposing Israel and the West (another possible fruit of the Iran-al-`Adl relationship, as al-`Adl’s son was in Yemen and AQAP has the global lead on al-Qa`ida propaganda). 26 Most attacks and foiled plots in Europe have been associated more or less closely with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), but the Solingen attack in Germany in August was carried out by a Syrian. 27 European CT agencies were particularly sensitive to the heightened threat this summer because of the high-profile sporting events being hosted in Germany (soccer) and France (the Olympics). Ultimately, there were no major attacks. The European CT agencies acknowledge that the threat is still far more rudimentary than what they faced from the Islamic State last decade and al-Qa`ida the decade before, when the organizations were systematically resourcing and projecting a threat into non-conflict zones. Neither has yet recovered that capability, and so the main threat comes from inspired lone actors, sometimes with limited facilitation. In the medium-long term, Europe will probably face a more developed capability and higher threat than now.

Central and South Asia Turning to Central and South Asia, and specifically Afghanistan, the story of the short-term threat picture is all about ISK and its associated GDP entity, the al-Siddiq office (ASO). The trajectory of ISK since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is concerning: Initially, it was preoccupied with fighting the Taliban domestically and its efforts at cross-border activity into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were feeble. But it became increasingly effective at operating in Pakistan and, this year, has carried out major attacks in Iran and Russia. 28 As with the Somali diaspora in the case of AKO activity, ISK/ASO operational activity usually exploits networks of ethnicities associated with the former Soviet Union (FSU): principally Tajiks but also Uzbeks, Chechens, Dagestanis, and others.

The large FSU communities providing labor for the Turkish economy are a population susceptible to Islamist radicalization and recruitment. Similar diasporas of guest workers exist in Moscow and St. Petersburg; and there are also large communities of Central Asian origin in Germany, Scandinavia, and elsewhere in Europe, as well as North America. Many attacks that have occurred and plots that have been disrupted in non-conflict zones in 2023-2024 have been inspired and/or facilitated by ISK and have included Tajik operatives. Western CT agencies consider ISK to be the most likely source of the next major terrorist attack in Europe or America. If it develops a more sophisticated external operations capability, that will become even more likely.

If ISK is the main short-medium term concern, the possibility of an even more serious threat incubating in Afghanistan under the Taliban must be taken seriously. Here, it is important in this author’s view for the United States to set aside partisan wrangling over what went wrong, because both political parties are to blame and both should focus on addressing the current and evolving threat. The fact is that al-Qa`ida and a range of other terrorist groups have safe haven in Afghanistan, and Saif al-`Adl has even called for extremists to migrate there. 29 The Taliban remain allied with these groups, especially TTP (the Pakistani Taliban), and are complicit not just in their presence and ability to train and organize, but also in TTP cross-border terrorist activity in Pakistan. Al-Qa`ida has been encouraged by the Afghan Taliban to assist and operate alongside TTP, just as it remains aligned with other ethnic extremist groups hostile to Afghanistan’s other neighbors.

Zooming Out It is true that al-Qa`ida-aligned groups do not pose a severe, immediate threat in non-conflict zones, partly because of a lack of capability and partly because sponsors such as the Taliban and Iran are cautious about being embarrassed and facing military consequences in the event of a major attack. But the Taliban’s default setting of using blackmail to get their way in international affairs and their intemperate reaction to any perceived slight against Islam that occurs anywhere in the world make clear that any Taliban restraint on al-Qa`ida is temporary and conditional. In view of the potential Afghanization of Somalia and the Western Sahel, the West is likely to face more failed states and more safe havens for terrorist groups. In the medium-long term, this could manifest as a much higher terrorist threat.

This does not factor in the implications of a more active operational partnership between Iran and al-Qa`ida, if that proves to be sustainable. 30 In the event of a serious escalation between Israel and Hezbollah; Israel and Iran; or indeed the United States and the “Axis of Resistance,” we will face a wholly different threat landscape, especially in Europe. The sheer numbers of European citizens who would likely be sympathetic to the Iranian side and hostile to any likely position adopted by the United States, United Kingdom, NATO, and major European powers will mean that a diversity of threats motivated by hatred of Israel (and straightforward antisemitism)—supported by Iran and other malign state and quasi-state actors, and whipped up by the full range of jihadi propaganda by the Islamic State, al-Qa`ida and others—would proliferate and potentially overwhelm CT defenses.

In conclusion, the period since 2017 will likely come to be regarded as one of calm and exceptional security, when CT agencies had a clear upper hand over the threat. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see any means by which that period will be long extended. Instead, we will have to get used to—as we have during previous periods—more frequent and more serious attacks in non-conflict zones. That is why a precipitous disinvestment from CT would be a tragic political mistake in present circumstances.     CTC

Edmund Fitton-Brown is Senior Advisor to the Counter Extremism Project. He is a former UK Foreign Service officer who was appointed Ambassador to Yemen from 2015 to 2017. He then served until 2022 as Coordinator of the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for Islamic State, al-Qa`ida and the Taliban. He is based in Austin, Texas.

© 2024 Edmund Fitton-Brown

Substantive Notes [a] This refers to the committee established in 1999 by U.N. Security Council resolution 1267 charged with monitoring global jihadi groups. The group’s remit was expanded by subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions 1989 and 2253 in 2011 and 2015, respectively. The committee currently tracks the threat around the world posed by both the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida and their various affiliates, branches, and sympathizers.

[b] The Wagner Group has now morphed into Russia’s Africa Corps. As noted by analysts, “Africa Corps differs from Wagner primarily in its official government status. The informal and private aspects of [Wagner Group founder Yevgeny] Prigozhin’s company have been largely removed, leaving a core expeditionary force intact. With this shift, Russia’s interventions on the continent are emerging out of the shadows of private initiative and into the limelight of official state project.” John A. Lechner and Sergey Eledinov, “Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group?” Foreign Policy , February 7, 2024.

Citations [1] See, for example, Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 15:11 (2022) and Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta, “After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa,” CTC Sentinel 16:9 (2023).

[2] Edith M. Lederer, “UN votes to end its peacekeeping mission in Mali as demanded by the country’s military junta,” Associated Press, June 30, 2023.

[3] For more on these dimensions, see Tore Hamming, “The Beginning of a New Wave? The Hamas-Israel War and the Terror Threat in the West,” CTC Sentinel 16:10 (2023).

[4] See, for example, Christopher Ayad, “France faces a growing, multi-faceted terrorist threat,” Monde , March 26, 2024; “German intelligence warns of heightened Islamist terror threat,” DPA via Yahoo, June 11, 2024; and Greg Wehner, “FBI director warns of jihadist attack in US, similar to Russian concert hall: ‘Heightened terrorist threat,’” Fox News, June 4, 2024.

[5] “Overcrowded refugee camp coping with up to 100,000 mothers and children in Syria,” Associated Press, April 2, 2019; “Unveiling the mental health crisis at Al-Hol Camp in northeast Syria,” Médecins Sans Frontières, January 19, 2024.

[6] “Twenty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations, July 21, 2021, p. 5.

[7] “Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations, July 22, 2024, p. 14.

[8] Ibid., p. 14.

[10] Ibid., p. 5.

[11] “Kenyan National Indicted for Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab,” U.S. Department of Justice, December 16, 2020.

[12] “Twenty-eighth report,” p. 9.

[13] For more on this, see Tore Hamming, “The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network,” CTC Sentinel 16:7 (2023).

[14] “Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations, July 15, 2022, p. 5.

[16] “Thirty-fourth report,” pp. 9-10.

[17] See Austin Doctor and Gina Ligon, “The Death of an Islamic State Global Leader in Africa?” CTC Sentinel 17:7 (2024).

[18] Courtney Kube, “Global leader of ISIS targeted and possibly killed in U.S. airstrike,” NBC News, June 15, 2024.

[19] Caleb Weiss, “Happy to be proven wrong, but Mumin being Caliph is v hard to believe …,” X, June 15, 2024; Doctor and Ligon.

[21] “Thirty-fourth report,” p. 6.

[22] Ibid., p. 7; Mathias Khalfaoui and Sahel Security Analysis, “Danger at Senegal’s Gates: The Jihadist Expansion toward Southwestern Mali,” Hudson Institute, October 13, 2023.

[23] Assim al-Sabri, “How the Gaza Crisis Could Bring Iran and Al-Qaeda in Yemen Together,” Sanaa Center, December 11, 2023.

[24] “Thirty-Fourth report,” p. 14.

[25] Ayad; “German intelligence warns of heightened Islamist terror threat.”

[26] See, for example, “Thirty-third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations, January 29, 2024.

[27] Carlo Angerer and Phil Helsel, “Syrian man arrested over deadly knife attack in Germany; Islamic State group claims responsibility,” NBC News, August 23, 2024.

[28] Eric Schmitt, “What We Know About ISIS-K, the Group That Has Been Linked to the Moscow Attack,” New York Times , March 22, 2024.

[29] Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda leader calls foreign fighters to Afghanistan,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 8, 2024.

[30] For more on earlier cooperation between the two, see Assaf Moghadam, “Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa`ida’s Tactical Cooperation,” CTC Sentinel 10:4 (2017).

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