hmas voyager ii

Navy Commemorates the 60th Anniversary of the Sinking of HMAS Voyager II

10 February 2024

The Royal Australian Navy today honoured the fallen, the survivors, and the families of the sinking of the destroyer HMAS Voyager II , at a public memorial to commemorate the 60 th anniversary of the event.

Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond attended the memorial service at Voyager Park in Huskisson, New South Wales.

Vice Admiral Hammond said today was an opportunity to come together to remember, to commemorate, and to honour.

“Today is about the courage, the commitment, and the remarkable human spirit shown by the fallen and the survivors of that night on 10 February 1964,” Vice Admiral Hammond said.

“While this incident occurred 60 years ago, time does not dull the weight of this loss.

“Tonight’s service is a powerful reminder that our power at sea is our people, and their shared commitment to making our country safer, stronger and more secure.”

HMAS Voyager II sunk after a collision with aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne II during a night flying exercise in the Eastern Australia Exercise Area.

Eighty-two members of ship’s company were lost in the collision, including 67 sailors, 14 officers, and one civilian dockworker.

The tragedy was the largest loss of life in a peacetime incident in Australian history.

More information about HMAS Voyager II is available on www.navy.gov.au .

Media will be able to access imagery from the event at: https://images.defence.gov.au/S20240217 .

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HMAS Voyager survivors commemorate maritime disaster's 60th anniversary off Jervis Bay

Two men arm in arm at the Voyager memorial

Gary "Hippy" Perrin vividly remembers 60 years ago today when he was thrown from his bed on board the Australian Navy ship HMAS Voyager.

"We were all over the place. Lockers, everything, came down on us," he said.

"Everything went dark except the emergency lights."

The then 17-year-old said he went into survival mode before discovering the HMAS Voyager had been struck by another naval ship off the south coast of New South Wales.

"When we finally made it out of the mess and onto the deck, we saw we'd been cut in half," Mr Perrin said.

On February 10, 1964, Mr Perrin became one of 232 sailors who survived the HMAS Voyager and HMAS Melbourne collision near Jervis Bay — one of the most traumatic maritime events in Australia's peacetime history.

Black and white image of group of men sitting on the floor

The disaster left 82 sailors dead.

"It was surreal. Something you think happens to someone else," Mr Perrin said.

"I lost a lot of friends that night."

The Voyager was carrying 314 people when it was accidentally sunk by the Melbourne just before 9pm.

The ship's front section disappeared less than 15 minutes after the impact.

Black and white image of sailing warship with big gap in its bow

More than 50 per cent of the sailors on board were teenagers on their first voyage, including then 17-year-old Duncan Fletcher who, "by a stroke of luck", survived his serious injuries.

Mr Fletcher was in the middle of the ship at the torpedo tube waiting for his shift to start when he was thrown from "starboard to stern on the port side".

"We heard the ship shutter. We heard, 'Full speed ahead', and then I looked up and saw the carrier coming over the top of us," he said.

"They found me wrapped around the guard rails."

Mr Fletcher was crushed by the impact and said the sound of screeching metal still haunted him today.

"If I hear my wife of 55 years drop something behind me, I am shattered," he said.

"It's just hard to get used to loud noises."

Sixty years on and still shrouded in anguish, 19 of the estimated 100 remaining survivors will today reunite with the families of the victims at Voyager Park, Huskisson, to remember the tragedy.

Finding comfort in company

Now aged in their late 70s, best mates Mr Fletcher and Mr Perrin say being with each other and their fellow survivors helps them cope with their post-traumatic stress.

"It's extremely important. We never got any help when it first happened and I think that was a mistake," Mr Fletcher said.

"Someone should've helped us."

black and white image of a smashed up boat bow

Both men say they neither forgive nor forget the events that led to two royal commissions in pursuit of justice and the truth.

"The royal commissions weren't worth a dill of cold water," Mr Perrin said.

"The government of the day, well, you could've bought the whole lot of them for two-bob."

"Apology? Never heard of it."

Man sits on mobility scooter near a black memorial wall

Time to say goodbye

This year's 60th anniversary of the Voyager disaster is expected to mark the last major reunion for survivors and families of victims.

Brenda Hannas established the HMAS Voyager Survivors Association in 1994 after she married survivor, John Hannas, who was now in full-time care.

She said the reunion was getting too hard to organise now, with many of the men elderly and ill.

"This will be the last reunion, but it will not be the end of the association," she said.

Three people arm in arm at Voyager memorial site

Ms Hannas said 30 years ago, the association had only brought together 10 of the 1964 survivors.

"But then we managed to track all but three of the 232 survivors worldwide," she said.

She said the memorials had helped a lot of men who previously would not talk about their trauma.

A small commemoration would still be held in Jervis Bay each year, on February 10, at 8:45pm, for those who wished to remember.

"It's very important to remember those people," Ms Hannas said.

"Because there's 82 sailors out there, under the water, and they should never be forgotten."

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60th anniversary of sinking of HMAS Voyager II

Monday 10 February 2014 marks the 50 th anniversary of a momentous event in Royal Australian Navy (RAN) history, the loss of the destroyer HMAS Voyager II following a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne II.

Read more about: 60th anniversary of sinking of HMAS Voyager II

Last updated: 21 May 2024

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are advised that this website may contain images and voices of deceased people.

The tragic loss of the Voyager

Introduction

“ They became men overnight” . A reference to young 19 year-old crewmen that had only been in the Navy for six months and rose to the occasion in the rescue operations after Voyager collided with HMAS Melbourne .

Tomorrow marks the day, 60 years ago, of the worst peace-time tragedy for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

Towards the end of a series of routine training exercises 20 nautical miles off Jervis Bay, the Daring class destroyer Voyager made a tragic mistake in calm conditions. It inexplicably turned towards the bow of the RAN flagship, HMAS Melbourne . Both ships collided, and Voyager was cut in half and sunk with 82 dead.

HMAS Melbourne

The RAN had three ships bearing the name HMAS Melbourne . HMAS Melbourne (II) was commissioned in 1955 and was one of six Majestic Class light fleet aircraft carriers ordered for the Royal Navy (RN) during World War II. Named initially HMS Majestic , the ship was close to launch in 1945 when the RN halted construction due to the war’s end. In 1946, the RAN was allowed to investigate the establishment of a naval fleet Air Arm similar to the RN. The RN had six partially completed Majestics, and the RAN decided to purchase two of them, along with two Carrier Air Groups and establish a naval air station.

The two Majestic Class HM ships, Terrible and Majestic, were purchased and renamed Sydney (III) and Melbourne (II). The advent of jet-propulsion aircraft drove post-war technological developments. It led to a rapid development in the designs of carriers to accommodate more dynamic jet aircraft.

Work resumed on Melbourne in 1949, where the RAN decided to increase the flight deck lift size to accommodate larger aircraft coming into service. While the construction of the RAN’s first carrier, HMAS Sydney (III), was too advanced to include these modifications, the construction of Melbourne was still at an early enough stage for their inclusion. In 1952, RAN added a modified flight deck of 5 1 / 2 degrees, a steam catapult and a mirror deck-landing system.

On 28 October 1955, the ship was officially named and commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Melbourne under the command of Captain Galfrey Gatacre. The first aircraft to land on her was a Westland Whirlwind helicopter from the RN. Not long afterwards, the first fixed-wing landed was a Hawker De Havilland Sea Venom and then a Fairy Gannet during trials in the English Channel.

Her voyage to Australia was via the Mediterranean Sea, through the Suez Canal, before crossing the Indian Ocean and arriving in Fremantle on 23 April 1956. The RAN revealed in media interviews that Melbourne could deploy her jet aircraft by night and day. It gave Australia a naval advantage not possessed by any land-based air force operating jet aircraft in the region.

The Melbourne’s base was at Jervis Bay, where 64 aircraft that the Melbourne had brought from the UK were transferred ashore in July 1956. Melbourne maintained a regular program of exercises, training and maintenance over the next decade, including annual deployments to the Asia-Pacific region.

Melbourne sailed to Hervey Bay the following month to provide flying training for the aircraft squadron. Unfortunately, Lieutenants Barry Thompson and Keith Potts of 808 Squadron were both killed when their Sea Venom crashed into the sea shortly after take-off. The cause of the accident was never determined, although investigators believed insufficient wind speed over the deck was the main reason.

Immediately after her arrival, she sailed for Port Melbourne in late November to participate in the staging of the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games. The Flagship band was part of the RAN massed bands that gave a polished display in the main stadium. One formation display was the presentation of simultaneous marching and playing into a design of the five interlocking rings of the Olympic symbol as a prelude to the official opening ceremony.

Personnel from Melbourne also acted as marshals at various venues every day of the event.

Another notable highlight was returning to Melbourne at the end of January 1959 to take part in filming scenes for the movie On the Beach , directed by Stanley Kramer. Melbourne was also the abandoned hulk in the adaption of Neville Shute’s post-nuclear holocaust novel of the same name.

HMAS Voyager

Advances in destroyer design in the UK during the mid to late 1940s led to the design of the Daring Class ship, described initially as a light cruiser. They departed from the conventional destroyer in design, armament and number of personnel carried. While still retaining the strike power of a light Cruiser, it possessed the latest anti-submarine detection devices.

The Australian-built Daring Class destroyers were like others built for the RN. Still, they had modifications to suit Australian conditions such as excellent ventilation and air conditioning, cafeteria messing and bunks instead of hammocks.

Initially, the government ordered the construction of four Darings for the RAN, but only three – Voyager (II), Vendetta (II) and Vampire (II) – were eventually built. Voyager was ordered in December 1946 from Cockatoo Island Dockyard and became ship number 188.

HMAS Voyager (II) was part of the first prefabricated, all-welded ship built in Australia. At the time, the Darings were the RAN’s largest conventional destroyers. Voyager was launched on 1 March 1952 by Mrs (later Dame) Patti Menzies, wife of the Prime Minister.

They were designed and built as versatile, multi-purpose “Gun Ships” with three separate weapon control systems to control the primary and secondary armament.

Voyager spent most of its time stationed in South-East Asia, returning to Australia for major maintenance and upgrades. In January 1963, Captain Duncan Stevens assumed command of Voyager from Commander Willis. The ship spent most of the year in Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo. Voyager arrived at the Williamstown Dockyard in Melbourne in August of that year for a major refit.

She replaced Voyager I which lay helpless aground at Betano Bay, Timor in September 1942 after she arrived, landing troops to supplement the Number 2 Independent Company attached to Sparrow Force of the 8 th Australian Division who would not surrender after the Japanese occupation. A regular Japanese reconnaissance plane sighted the stricken ship. It went back to its base at the capital of the slender island. Then came the bombers and in anticipation of the bombing raid, it was decided to abandon ship. A Japanese bomb collected Voyager’s stores including crates of beer. The Voyager crew set of demolition charges which destroyed the ship. The Japanese troops followed the bombing. Luckily, HMA ships Kalgoorlie and Warnambool managed to safely evacuate the Australians.

The training exercise

Voyager emerged from the dockyards in late January 1964 with a significant percentage of her crew new to the ship. She sailed to Sydney in preparation for another deployment to South East Asia. But before doing so, she diverted to Jervis Bay on Thursday, 6 February 1964, to participate in training exercises with HMAS Melbourne. Both ships anchored in time for the crews to enjoy a weekend of sport and recreation. However, when Voyager was taking station on Melbourne for entry into Jervis Bay, she made a mess of manoeuvring into position. She had to turn astern to avoid impact with the bigger ship.

On Monday, 10 February, they sailed from Jervis Bay before dawn to conduct a series of trials and exercises.

The two ships used the opportunity to correct problems found in the dockyards and refresh everyone on sea-going routines. For Voyager , this included a shore bombardment and anti-submarine exercises with the British submarine Tabard , all while circling Melbourne . Melbourne practised anti-aircraft tracking, conducted radio sea trials, and exercised emergency stations.

At 18:00, Voyager had closed in on Melbourne for the first time that day to transfer mail by heaving line. After the transfer, Voyager was stationed five miles ahead of the carrier for over an hour as they waited for darkness and orders to take up station from the senior ship. During that time, they conducted radar calibration trials. The sun set at 19:45, and Voyager was ordered to rejoin Melbourne in preparation for the night flying exercises. It was a moonless night; the weather was fine, and the sea was calm on a slight swell.

That night, Melbourne was involved in night flying exercises that involved high-tempo night landing evolutions with Gannets and Sea Venoms out of the NAS Nowra base. Voyager’s role was that of planeguard, involving the rescue, if necessary, of aircraft personnel from the sea. The Gannets were due between 20:00 and 20:30, and two Sea Venoms between 20:30 and 21:00.

It was the first time both ships were involved in close quarters in the six months since their refit. Both ships were “darkened” during the exercise, with only navigational and operational lighting in use.

Melbourne’s Commanding Officer, Captain John Robertson, signalled to Voyager that the course the carrier would proceed while operating the aircraft was 180 degrees at 20 knots. The fundamental principle during this exercise is that the destroyer keeps clear of the carrier while she operates the aircraft. The position Voyager was to take is called “Planeguard Station No 1” – a position 20 degrees on the carrier’s port quarter at a distance between 1,500 and 2,000 yards.

With both ships heading north and the flying course to the south, Voyager was in a position when Robertson gave the signal for both ships to turn together 180 degrees. This movement happened at 19:50. However, the winds were light and variable, and Robertson had to alter speed and course to get the maximum headwind across the flight deck. He signalled minor variations in the course to Voyager . By the time the Sea Venoms were due to arrive, they were on a course of 175 degrees and at a speed of 22 knots. When the Sea Venoms arrived for their “touch and go” exercises at 20:30, Robertson again altered course to 190 degrees. Throughout these simple manoeuvres, Voyager maintained her correct station.

With insufficient wind available for the flying exercise on a southerly course, Robertson signalled Voyager he would delay operations for about ten minutes. At 20:41, Robertson ordered a turn starboard together to 020 degrees. This manoeuvre placed the Voyager ahead of the carrier.

After steadying on a new course, Robertson decided to compare the wind across the deck on a more easterly course of 060 degrees, and they changed at 20:47. Voyager was “ahead” of station to starboard of her correct position 30 degrees on Melbourne’s port bow, but still 2,000 yards away.

The fatal manoeuvre and rescue

After deciding the wind was better on the previous course, at 20:52, Robertson signalled a turn back to 020 at 22 knots, with ships turning together to port. While they were still turning, Robertson signalled, “flying course 020 speed 22 knots”. For Voyager , sailing just ahead of and on the starboard (right) side of the carrier meant repositioning to port and astern. The safest and most logical method to do this would involve a turn to starboard, allowing Melbourne to pass, and conducting a long progressive arc around the back of the carrier to take up Planeguard Station No 1.

Voyager immediately turned starboard to loop around and behind Melbourne . However, for reasons unexplained to this day, the unthinkable happened. The destroyer inexplicably reversed its course.

Maybe it was confused and disorientated in the darkness, but Voyager turned to port. Melbourne didn’t raise any alarms immediately as the bridge crew on Melbourne thought it would carry out a fishtail or zigzag course to slow its momentum. Manoeuvring ships at sea requires a high level of skill and concentration.

According to a junior member and one of only two survivors on Voyager’s bridge, while this was happening, Stevens was conferring with his navigator and Communications Yeoman, most likely over Melbourne’s signals. It did not occur to Robertson that the Voyager was unaware of her position relative to Melbourne , so no one sent urgent messages or signals to warn Voyager .

Failure to do so would plague and haunt Robertson during the inquiries and make him the Navy’s scapegoat. The first inquiry determined that he could have prevented the collision, considering this was only two minutes before the accident. The colossal carrier could not slow or change course to avoid a collision. Weighing 20,000 tons, it cannot turn like a speed boat.

When officers on the carrier realised Voyager was still turning to port and 800 yards away, they knew it would pass in front of them, and it was too late to avoid a collision.

Between 20:55 and 20:56, Robertson ordered Melbourne “full astern both engines”, and Captain Stevens ordered Voyager “full ahead both engines. Hard a-starboard” in a futile attempt to avoid a collision. He hoped that by doing this, Voyager would either pass ahead of Melbourne or turn inside her path. Not so. They were only 300 yards apart.

After giving his last order to try and change the destroyer’s course, Stevens told his Quartermaster they were in an emergency and to “pipe collision stations”. At 8:56 pm, the carrier hit Voyager just aft of the bridge, killing the senior officers on the bridge on impact. Keeled over, Voyager was pushed laterally for a few seconds before the immense forces sliced her in two.

There were men in the forward cafeteria of the bow. After separating from the rest of the destroyer, the bow heeled sharply about 60 degrees onto its starboard side and turned upside down. The men tried to exit through the escape hatches as water poured in, but some wouldn’t open. Nor were lifejackets readily available. About 128 men escaped through the hatches out of the ship’s company of 314. They tried to stay afloat in the oil-covered water, making it difficult to see and breathe. Ten minutes later, the bow sank, taking trapped men with it.

Captain Robertson ordered boats in the water and nets over the carrier’s side for survivors to clamber up. They also deployed eight helicopters to search for survivors in the water. Another six ships arrived to help in the search and rescue – HMAS Stuart and minesweepers Hawk, Gull, Ibis, Curlew and Snipe. It was a scene of panic and turmoil at night.

The other half of Voyager defiantly stayed afloat after the salvage and rescue operations began. However, after 30 minutes, the bulkhead forward of the boiler room collapsed, and the stern started to rise out of the water. The injured were lowered into life rafts, while others jumped into the sea after somebody gave the order to abandon the ship. The Voyager sank to lie some 150 metres deep, 20 nautical miles from Cape Perpendicular.

A Navy Wessex helicopter arrived to lift men out of the water. But it proved limited in its ability to assist mainly because the downdraught from its blades was a full gale force and made the ocean surface too rough, blinding those in the water with oily sea spray. Also, hardly any of the sailors had any wet winch training. Consequently, the helicopter rescued very few men.

Over the next three hours, Melbourne’s ship’s company desperately tried to recover those in the water. The ships managed to rescue 232 men. On survivor, told of 56-pound shells exploding in the magazine below the water level as Voyager started to sink. “I was terrified. I didn’t know whether I was going to be blown up or drowned”.

On the following Wednesday morning, a lonely, gouged and torpid warship – an aircraft carrier no less and once the pride of the fleet – limped into dry dock at Garden Island in Sydney with a massive gauge out of its bow.

The inquiries

The nation was shocked as images of the damaged bow of Melbourne and the rescued men came to light. For RAN, the accident immediately put the spotlight on the naval hierarchy. The Voyager tragedy came just three months after senior officers sent five junior officers in a whaler from HMAS Sydney to sail around Hook and Hayman Islands in the Whitsundays on an out-of-sight sailing exercise in dubious weather. Rescuers found two dead inside the upturned whaler, but they never located the other three men. They were presumed drowned. Sadly, four midshipmen who served on Sydney during this tragedy were among those lost on the Voyager . There were six other major incidents involving RAN ships in the preceding four years.

Captain Bill Dovers (later Rear Admiral) was initially convicted “of failing to keep himself informed of the progress of the whaler” at a court martial. However, the Naval Board overturned this, effectively sending the captain on a promotion course. The public saw this as RAN not keeping its officers accountable, which led to Parliament and the public lacking trust. Many saw RAN as an old boy’s club protecting each other.

It didn’t help that the Naval Board were not forthcoming with details about the Voyager accident during the night of the collision with the press or its political masters. The reason for this was partly a reflection of the confusion at the time. It took Robertson sometime after the accident in total darkness to fully understand the gravity of the damage and eventual fate Voyager suffered and report that back to his superiors. Based on his early reports, RAN headquarters initially thought Voyager had lost her bows, which normally would not lead to a significant loss of life .

Uncomfortable rumours circulated after the incident. How could the RAN allow such a tragedy where one ship sliced another in half on a training exercise during peace time? These deaths were not a sacrifice for the country’s defence but resulted from officer error or, quite possibly, negligence.

Thus, it was no surprise that the Naval Board’s immediate action was to set up its inquiry into the tragedy because this is what always happened. They believed a routine Naval Board inquiry was the most effective means of determining what happened.

However, Prime Minister Menzies had other ideas. He feared the Navy would close ranks and attempt a cover up. Peers investigating their members didn’t sit well with him, particularly after the Whitsunday Whaler fiasco. Given the magnitude of the disaster, he wanted a Naval Court presided over by a judge. He made a public announcement saying an inquiry would immediately begin. But he didn’t know about the many bureaucratic and legislative hurdles that prevented him from getting his way without recalling Parliament to pass a law, which would delay any inquiry too long. Menzies also found out that a Marine Court of Inquiry under the Navigation Act 1912 excluded naval ships, and the Royal Commission Act 1902 also needed amendment to allow him to run his sort of inquiry.

Still, Menzies hastily convened the first inquiry to try and lay the matter to rest quickly. He announced to the media on 13 February a Royal Commission to investigate the tragedy. It was clear from its terms of reference that there was little consultation with RAN. Because there was no provision under the act to appoint naval assessors, they could only be involved on an informal and advisory basis. As maritime historian Tom Frame wrote in his book The Cruel Legacy , it was perhaps Australia’s only unintentional Royal Commission.

Senior RAN officers felt the Navy’s honour was being attacked because the government, on behalf of the public, could not trust it to investigate its disaster. A retired naval commander wrote a scathing letter published in the Sydney Morning Herald :

“ Naval incidents should be dealt with by Naval authorities and in this case the magnitude of the disaster in terms of loss of life or loss of ship should not be confused with the business of a straight-forward inquiry into a collision at sea. The tactical error which produced the collision remains the same error , whether Melbourne scraped paint from Voyager’s stern with no loss of life or sank her with all hands . With hysterical precision, the Government swept aside all the long standing and well tried naval procedures, implying immediately that its Naval Board of Admirals and its Flag Officer commanding the Fleet were incompetent to investigate the matter ”.

Nevertheless, Richard Peek, Melbourne’s previous captain and Philip Stevens, captain of Voyager’s sister ship (until 14 February 1964), HMAS Vendetta, were appointed by the Naval Board to assist the Royal Commission Counsel. The government appointed Sir John Spicer, Chief Justice of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, as the Commissioner.

Robertson represented himself at the inquiry. His recollections of what happened changed several times, and the Commission’s Counsel alleged that he was trying to provide an account that served his own interests.

The Commission concluded that whatever the initiating cause of the accident, most likely a misunderstanding of the signals Robertson sent and what he ordered Voyager to steer, it seemed incomprehensible that no one on duty on her bridge was not looking where the ship was headed during its turning manoeuvre. According to Tom Frame, Voyager was at fault for failing to maintain a proper lookout and keep out of Melbourne’s way. The Commissioners believed that while Melbourne did what was required of her in terms of manoeuvring rules, her bridge staff were guilty of avoiding the development of a dangerous navigational situation and, ultimately, the collision. However, they emphasised the possibility that Voyager was on a steady course after the last turning circle. They saw Robertson’s failure to act decisively at this time as a contributing factor to the collision. In the end, though, based on legal advice, the Naval Board took no action against Melbourne’s officers.

During the Royal Commission, Robertson was temporarily relieved of command of Melbourne while she was on deployment in South East Asia after being repaired. Following the Royal Commission, the Naval Board decided they could not reappoint Robertson as commander, mainly as there was a likelihood Australia may get involved in a war with Indonesia, which would require substantial naval resources. Instead, Robertson was appointed as commander of the training facility HMAS Watson . He saw a land posting as a demotion and decided to resign. The media supported Robertson’s position and believed he was the scapegoat to protect the Navy and its most senior officers. The Daily Mirror’s editorial on 18 September said:

“ His axing, thinly disguised as a shore posting, is a disgraceful under-handed move by the government ”.

Parliament hotly debated Robertson’s resignation and request for a pension, dominating the news for over two weeks. But more was to come the following month, when retired Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, who was Voyager’s executive officer until four weeks before the collision, told Robertson, “Stevens frequently drank to excess while in harbour”. Although he never drank at sea, Cabban claimed “on several occasions”, the effects of alcohol prevented Stevens from exercising command when Voyager returned to sea. This revelation, in concert with a book written in collaboration with Robertson by a sympathetic retired RN Vice Admiral, Harold Hickling, and the persistent representations made by Victorian Liberal backbencher John Jess, were the catalysts for a new inquiry.

On 18 May 1967, new prime minister Harold Holt announced a further inquiry into the Voyager sinking in the form of another Royal Commission. Never before had the country seen a matter become the subject of two Royal Commissions. However, strictly speaking, the terms of reference for the second inquiry meant it was not a “second Voyager inquiry”. It did not allow the re-hearing of any evidence relating to events immediately before the collision. It was more an examination of Steven’s fitness to command, whether the Naval Board was aware of his lack of fitness, and if that was determined, whether they needed to alter the findings of the first Commission.

The second inquiry found that Duncan Stevens, the captain of Voyager, was medically unfit for command. It also absolved Melbourne’s captain and crew from blame. The credible argument was Robertson’s counsel convincing the three Commissioners, through detailed evidence, that the conclusion drawn in the first Royal Commission about navigation and time sequences before the collision was incorrect. He was able to demonstrate, with the help of Robertson’s experience, that the Voyager had not steadied on a course for a minute before the collision but was still turning. Also, the actions required by a turning signal meant Voyager had no discretion in manoeuvring, whereas in a flying signal, Voyager had complete discretion. Thus, Robertson was not obliged to challenge her movements and the original finding against him was overturned.

It was incredible that two Royal Commissions into the accident were inconclusive about the cause of the tragedy. The inquiries were criticised for poor investigations into the accident, although my readings of summaries of the inquiries showed they were pretty detailed and exhaustive. The difficulty was that the key witnesses – the officers controlling Voyager who made the decisions they did – died and went down with the ship, rendering meaningful conclusions almost impossible.

The aftermath

For many years after the tragedy, the fault was blamed on Melbourne, which only added to the survivor guilt felt by the sailors. Some couldn’t understand why Melbourne didn’t turn to avoid the collision. The helm position is below the flight deck, near the catapult launch control, and the helmsman cannot see out. Also, he cannot change course without orders. It’s a demanding watch. A ship the size of Melbourne cannot easily manoeuvre like a recreational speed boat. It takes up to one and a half nautical miles to bring a 20,000-ton ship to a halt. The only way Melbourne could avoid a collision was to turn away, hoping they had time.

The Melbourne-Voyager collision stunned the nation. It was a traumatic night for all those involved. Given those times, the media believed the RAN offered very little support to their sailors. Sailors were given a week’s survivor’s leave and then sent back on detail on sister ships. Allegedly they were ordered not to speak to the media, but I have seen press clippings less than a week after the accident interviewing survivors. Also, allegedly, there was minimal post-collision mental care or recognition of trauma. However, according to Frame, the Navy made every effort to “extend a hand of friendship and compassion to those who served on Voyager .

RAN experienced dramatic falls in recruiting numbers for many years afterwards, demonstrating a lack of faith in its abilities. This is despite the government announcing record spending in late 1964 that targeted increased personnel strength. Recruitment numbers did not recover for several years. One government minister at the time believed the Naval Board had no idea how low their public image had fallen.

While RAN did all it could to persuade the government to “rebut publicly the false accusations that had been made” against the Navy, there was a concession on their part of their inadequacies in the actions they were forced to take to improve their fleet operations. Instructions for tactical manoeuvring and signalling were amended; the location and operation of the bridge and operations room loudspeakers were reviewed, together with the placement and briefing of bridge lookouts; introduction of new mechanisms to remove the use of wheel spanners to open hatches; changes in the use of life-saving and safety equipment; a review of training into greater familiarity of life rafts and helicopter winching; and a higher proficiency standard for swimming ability.

Many survivors suffered after the collision. The average age of the survivors was 25, and many were young, raw recruits serving at sea for the first time. So too, did the sailors on Melbourne. They carried a heavy burden and stigma being on Melbourne after having to perform rescue duties. There were massive ramifications for the sailors involved. The injuries they witnessed traumatised them, with many leaving active service not long after, or after their career, being diagnosed with PTSD. Sadly, most of the rescued sailors subsequently died of cancer, believed to be caused by ingesting oil after the collision.

All this only added to the anguish of the surviving sailors, as they wanted closure and peace. They felt the RAN was ashamed of the incident, which led to its servicemen, the government, and the public losing trust.

Only recently, John Werner spoke about the crash for the first time. He was an electrician on Melbourne and knew about a refit carried out shortly before the incident. When he was on duty on the night of the accident, he set up the floodlighting on the carrier’s deck and noticed the floodlights had red filters. Before, they were white. He thinks the officers in the bridge on Voyager mistook the red for the stern and thus kept course to cut across when, in fact, it was the bow that was lit up. Werner thinks that because at least one of the red floodlights was facing starboard, it overshone the green navigation light, misleading the officers on Voyager into thinking it was the port navigation light.

However, the royal commissions didn’t think the red floodlights were the cause of the collision. They were critical of Captain Stevenson, deeming him unfit to command due to medical reasons. The first Royal Commission contentiously held Melbourne’s command team partially responsible for failing to prevent the collision. It led to the resignation of Captain Robertson.

The subsequent Commission overturned that finding, driven by a parliamentary backbench that railed against the Naval Board, which they saw as protecting itself by sacrificing its members. Unfortunately, like the first Commission, it could not determine the cause of the tragedy. The investigations were drawn out for the sailors involved and their families. They were also controversial, inconclusive and a source of additional pain.

According to some, including Professor Tom Frame, who has written two books on the tragedy, RAN didn’t adequately explain to its sailors why they thought the accident occurred, which led to much speculation akin to Werner’s thoughts. Werner said the inquiry dismissed his evidence, adding to the perception of secrecy and “treating junior sailors as an expendable commodity”. The Commissions were characterised by a hostile approach to witnesses and highlighted the unsuitability of a Royal Commission to investigate, mainly when the civilian investigators lacked naval knowledge.

In his paper on the tragedy , Chris Oxenbould believed the main reason for the collision on Voyager was the lack of sufficient lookout personnel. Her most experienced watchkeeper was absent, the Officer of the Watch was inexperienced, and the key lookout was on his first sea voyage. Captain Stevens, aboard Voyager , was the only experienced officer on either bridge. Every other officer had been recently posted onto Melbourne or Voyager, and this was their first night at sea in company for five months.

On 21 February 1964, memorial services were held throughout Australia to pay respects to the men from the Voyager who lost their lives.

On the shores of Jervis Bay in the town of Huskisson, there is an HMAS Voyager (II) memorial park. There is also a memorial at Voyager Park in the Sydney suburb of East Hills. Voyager Point runs alongside the Georges River just across the road. HMAS Cerberus also has an HMAS Voyager (II) memorial featuring a bronze statue of a sailor on a stone cairn.

Tasmania’s Maritime Museum at Devonport also has a memorial commemorating HMAS Voyager (II). It reads:

“ The naval destroyer HMAS Voyager (II) was lost on the night of 10 February 1964 in a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (II). Nine Tasmanians were serving on the Voyager (II), four of whom were among the eighty-two men who died that night:

AB Neil Benjamin Brown

Ordinary SMN John David Clayton

Ordinary SMN Graham Dennis Fitzallen

Leonard Charles Lehman (cook)

The repair work kept Melbourne in Sydney for three months. She returned to sea on 11 May 1964. She attended her annual South East Asian deployments, which included time in New Guinea, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.

She participated in many overseas exercises, including FOTEX, WINCHESTER and FIRST TIME. During the latter exercise, a Gannet experienced a total loss of power on take-off and ditched into the sea, about 500 metres from the ship. Helicopters quickly recovered the crew.

Melbourne also spent time in American waters. In 1968, she underwent a major refit at Garden Island to accommodate new A4 Skyhawk aircraft and radar communication equipment.

In late May 1969, Melbourne returned to sea to participate in US Navy exercises. In the early hours of 31 May, in the South China Sea, Melbourne’s captain ordered USS Everett F Larson to take up a planeguard position astern of Melbourne from off her starboard bow. At one stage, Larson made an incorrect turn and was on a collision course with Melbourne . Corrective action from both ships avoided a collision. This event not only revived memories of the Voyager tragedy five years earlier but also pre-empted another tragedy to come.

In the early hours of 3 June, in a manoeuvre almost identical to the near miss with Larson a few days earlier, the destroyer USS Frank E Evans crossed Melbourne’s bows while attempting to move in the planeguard position and was cut in two. The forward section of Evans sank quickly while Melbourne’s crew secured her stern section to the starboard side. This action enabled rescuers to search that part of the ship for survivors. Seventy-four of Evans’ crew lost their lives, and Melbourne once again sustained extensive damage to her bow section. Search and rescue operations began immediately, saving 199 men. Melbourne steamed towards Singapore Harbour that afternoon with flags at half-mast.

A joint US Navy/RAN Board of Inquiry into the tragedy held Captain Stevenson partly responsible, stating that as Commanding Officer of Melbourne , he could have done more to prevent the collision from occurring. However, a subsequent RAN court martial cleared him of any responsibility. The integrity of the initial Board of Inquiry has since been questioned, notably as it was presided over by Rear Admiral Jerome H King, US Navy, the officer in overall tactical command of Evans at the time of the collision. The Captain of Evans , Commander Albert McLemore, was asleep in his bunk during the manoeuvre, leaving two very inexperienced watchkeeping officers on the bridge. All observers and those knowledgeable of naval procedures and operations knew the blame solely laid on the appalling incompetence of the US ship, even though the inquiry didn’t come to that conclusion. Stevenson’s defence council, Gordon Samuels, QC, later Governor of New South Wales, said that he had:

“ …never seen a prosecution case so bereft of any possible proof of guilt”.

Melbourne continued its service in the RAN with deployments around the world. While there were other incidents, there were no more collisions with other ships.

She entered Sydney for another round of maintenance and refit in November 1981, and the following February, the federal government announced arrangements to purchase the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible from the RN to replace the ageing Melbourne , which would be placed in “contingent reserve”.

She was decommissioned on 30 June 1982, having spent 62,036 hours at sea and travelled 868,893 nautical miles. It was a fittingly grey, cold and rainy day for her farewell from Sydney to the trouble-prone but immortalised (in film) HMAS Melbourne as she was towed out of the harbour for the last time bound for a Chinese scrap metal heap in April 1985, thus ending a tumultuous 26-year career as an aircraft carrier.

This blog is dedicated to the memory of Able Seaman Peter Robert Carr, who was onboard Voyager when it collided with Melbourne and sunk. He went missing and his body was never recovered. Carr is the uncle of a mate, Brad “Bluey” Carr, who also served in the Royal Australian Navy.

1 thought on “The tragic loss of the Voyager”

An excellent read for those not familiar with this major maritime incident.

I think that the reference to little post trauma care should be put in context of the time in occurred and noted in the article.

Perhaps a statement, consistent with practices within the RAN, those impacted were not provided with limited post trauma care.

HMAS Voyager II

About This Unit

The following is an extract from HMAS Voyager (II)'s 'Welcome Aboard' brochure, which elaborates on the innovative features of the then new class of warship:

"Voyager (II) is the first of three Daring class ships to be placed on order with Australian Shipyards by the Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board. This class of ship is a departure from the conventional destroyer both in general design, armament, and number of personnel carried. She has the striking power of a light Cruiser (the disposition of her main armament being typical of that type of ship), coupled with the latest anti-submarine weapon and detection devices. Furthermore, her manoeuverability is superior to that of even the most modern conventional destroyer, owing to the fitting of twin rudders. The other two ships of the class, in varying stages of construction, are Vendetta (II) and Vampire (II)...The ship carries two 25-foot motor-cutters powered by diesel engines, a 27-foot sailing whaler for use as a sea boat, and a 14-foot sailing dinghy for recreational purposes. War experience has shown that boats were vulnerable to damage by bomb and shell splinters, with the result that they were usually unserviceable if required for life-saving purposes. Voyager (II), therefore, carries the latest type of inflatable life raft. When not in use, these rafts take up very little space on deck, but when inflated, they will comfortably hold 20 men each, and in addition afford complete protection against the sea and elements. Sufficient of these rafts is carried to accommodate the entire ship's company. In addition, a Land Rover is carried for transport for the Postman and for general official duties. It is stored on the upper deck at sea...Voyager (II) is propelled by two out-turning propellers, each propeller-shaft being driven by its own high pressure, high-temperature turbine unit through double reduction gear. Steam for these turbines in provided by two Foster-Wheeler controlled superheat waterwall boilers...Fresh water for boilers and for domestic use is produced by two Caird and Rayner evaporator units, which are capable of a rate of 100 tons a day. Main machinery and boilers are arranged in what is known as 'The Unit System' ie, each shaft is driven by its own engine room and boiler room, though these can be inter-connected if required. Action damage to the main machinery is therefore more localised than in the conventional destroyer arrangement of only one engine room."

For more information click here: https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/50th-anniversary-sinking-hmas-voyager-ii (www.awm.gov.au)

Links and Documents

Research Links
Australian War Memorial - 50th anniversary of sinking of HMAS Voyager II
NAVY - HMAS Voyager II - [ includes complete list of names of dead and missing as a result of 1964 sinking ]

Members Forum

Welcome to the HMAS Voyager Survivors Association

For Survivors, Friends & Family.

Bluey Ducker 0414 953 355

Alex Hagerty 0414 496 351

Upcoming Events

2018 reunion husskission rsl (club jervis bay).

Our annual reunion in Jervis Bay is on again, keep the date free. Family & Friends Welcome.

Weekend of the 10th of February 2018

http://clubjervisbay.com.au

2018 Anzac Day March Sydney

Join us for the our annual Anzac Day March in Sydney

Wednesday 25th April 2018

Refreshments at the Crown Hotel - Goulburn Street Sydney http://rslnsw.org.au

HMAS Voyager (II) Memorial Park

Huskisson RSL Jervis Bay

Voyager Point NSW

Voyager Point is a suburb located on the Georges River in South Western Sydney

Voyager Park & Memorial NSW

Hmas cerberus hmas voyager ii memorial.

Located at Sirius Road and Orlando Crescent in the Suburb of East Hills in Sydney.

HMAS Voyager II Trophy - Anti Submarine Warfare Trophy

Memorial featuring a bronze statue of a sailor on a stone cairn.

Devonport Maritime Museum Tasmania

The memorial reads: "The naval destroyer HMAS Voyager (II) was lost on the night of 10 February 1964 in a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (II). Nine Tasmanians were serving on the Voyager (II), four of whom were among the eighty-two men who died that night:

AB Neil Benjamin Brown
Ordinary SMN John David Clayton
Ordinary SMN Graham Dennis Fitzallen
Leonard Charles Lehman (cook)"

Lost with HMAS Voyager (II) was the Otranto Shield for Torpedo, the tactical anti-submarine warfare trophy that she had won in 1963. On 10 February 1984 the RAN instituted the HMAS Voyager (II) Trophy for anti-submarine warfare proficiency, to be awarded annually to the "...escort which in the opinion of the Fleet Commander has achieved the best and most consistent anti-submarine sensor and weapon performance during the year."The inaugural winner was the guided missile frigate HMAS Canberra (II) for the year ended 1983. The most prolific winners have been HMAS Darwin with five awards and HMAS Perth (II) with four.

Ship Details

Hmas voyager ii.

Darling Class, Destroyer, D04. Motto: Quo Fata Vocant (We go where destiny calls)

Laid Down 10 October 1952 & Launched 1 May 1952 and Commissioned 12 February 1957. Lost at Sea on 10 February 1964.

Specifications

320, including 20 officers

390 feet in length, displacing 3800 tons, 33 knot top speed, 3700 mile range.

Two foster wheeler boilers, English Electric geared steam turbines (twin shaft) generating 54000 horsepower.

6 x 4.5 inch Mk V gun in 3 twin turrets, 6 x 40mm Bofors in 3 twin mounts. 10 x 21 inch Petad torpedo tubes. 1 x tripled barrelled 'limbo' anti submarine mortar.

HMAS Voyager (II)

Hmas voyager ii - background.

Advances in destroyer design in the United Kingdom during the mid to late 1940s resulted in the design of the Daring Class, originally described as light cruisers. The Australian built Daring Class destroyers were similar to the eight similar vessels being built for the Royal Navy, but with modifications for Australian conditions, with good ventilation and air conditioning being a priority.

Four Darings were initially ordered for the RAN, although only three, Voyager (II), Vendetta (II) and Vampire (II) were eventually completed. Voyager (II) was ordered on 3 December 1946 from Cockatoo Island Dockyard, and became Ship Number 188 on their records.

The Darings were built in sections, upside down from the centre, then rolled onto the slipway. They were the first prefabricated all-welded ships to be built in Australia, and used light alloys extensively both in the superstructure and in interior sub-divisions and fittings. At the time they were the largest conventional destroyers to be built for the RAN.

Construction of the ships was delayed due to industrial disputes, skilled manpower shortages, and delays in the supply of materials and vital machinery drawings from England. Between ordering and completion, the cost of each Daring increased from £2.6 million to almost £7 million! Voyager (II)'s final cost was over £6,750,000.

The Daring Class brought a new standard of accommodation to the RAN with air-conditioning, cafeteria messing and bunks instead of hammocks.

The Darings were designed and built as versatile, multi-purpose 'Gun Ships' with three separate weapon control systems to control the main and secondary armament. In the Naval Gunfire Support mode for example, the main Gunnery Fire Control System was capable of providing very accurate and rapid fire to a range of nine nautical miles (18,000 yards) in normal mode and in excess of ten nautical miles (20,000 yards) in extended range mode. At a rate of fire of 16 rounds per gun per minute, the Darings were capable of firing up to 100 x 4.5-inch shells per minute, with each standard high explosive shell weighing 56-lbs.

Voyager (II), the first ship to complete, mounted three twin 40-mm Bofors, one either side of the bridge superstructure, and the third abaft the second funnel. Both Vampire (II) and Vendetta (II) were completed with two single mounts abreast the superstructure and two twin mounts (one on each beam) abaft the second funnel.

An Innovative Warship

Innovative features of hmas voyager ii.

Voyager (II) is the first of three "Darling" Class ships to be placed on order with Australian Shipyards by the Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board. This class of ship is a departure from the conventional destroyer both in general design, armament, and number of personnel carried.

She has the striking power of a light Cruiser (the disposition of her main armament being typical of that type of ship), coupled with the latest anti-submarine weapon and detection devices. Furthermore, her manoeuverability is superior to that of even the most modern conventional destroyer, owing to the fitting of twin rudders.

The other two ships of the class, in varying stages of construction, are Vendetta (II) and Vampire (II). ... The ship carries two 25-foot motor-cutters powered by diesel engines, a 27-foot sailing whaler for use as a sea boat, and a 14-foot sailing dinghy for recreational purposes.

War experience has shown that boats were vulnerable to damage by bomb and shell splinters, with the result that they were usually unserviceable if required for life-saving purposes. Voyager (II), therefore, carries the latest type of inflatable life raft. When not in use, these rafts take up very little space on deck, but when inflated, they will comfortably hold 20 men each, and in addition afford complete protection against the sea and elements. Sufficient of these rafts is carried to accommodate the entire ship's company. In addition, a Land Rover is carried for transport for the Postman and for general official duties. It is stored on the upper deck at sea. ...

Voyager (II) is propelled by two out-turning propellers, each propeller-shaft being driven by its own high pressure, high-temperature turbine unit through double reduction gear. Steam for these turbines in provided by two Foster-Wheeler controlled superheat waterwall boilers ... Fresh water for boilers and for domestic use is produced by two Caird and Rayner evaporator units, which are capable of a rate of 100 tons a day. Main machinery and boilers are arranged in what is known as "The Unit System" i.e., each shaft is driven by its own engine room and boiler room, though these can be inter-connected if required. Action damage to the main machinery is therefore more localised than in the conventional destroyer arrangement of only one engine room.

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OPINION | HMAS Voyager (II): remembering the 82 fallen, and so many who would never be the same again

HMAS Voyager (Photo: Royal Australian Navy)

This last February 10 marks the 60th anniversary of the loss of the Royal Australian Navy destroyer HMAS Voyager (II), which sank 20 nautical miles south-east of Jervis Bay.

Of the 314 crew of Voyager , 82 were lost that night in Australia's worst peacetime military disaster. Many more lives were altered forever. We are a maritime nation and yet our maritime history is often forgotten. We must remember the loss of Voyager on the night of February 10, 1964.

The destroyer was escorting HMAS Melbourne (II), Australia's last aircraft carrier, as it carried out flying operations. Both ships had recently emerged from refits. Voyager was the "plane guard", positioned 1,000 to 2,000 yards off Melbourne 's port quarter to recover the crew of any aircraft that might ditch.

Following a series of manoeuvres, Voyager ended up out of position on Melbourne 's starboard bow and was required to resume her station. How and why Voyager ended up in this position remains unclear 60 years on, although there are many theories. In truth, we will never know as most of the bridge team were lost that night.

"Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night."

Presumably attempting to resume her station, Voyager was seen to alter to starboard away from the carrier, and then back to port towards it. The 3,600-tonne Voyager crossed the bow of the 20,000-tonne Melbourne . There was little time to react and despite attempts to avoid the collision in the final seconds, the two ships collided at 20:56. Melbourne 's bow struck Voyager aft of her bridge, severing the ship. Voyager 's bow passed down the port side of Melbourne , sinking within 10 minutes of the collision. A recovery operation was immediately launched by Melbourne , which was joined by several vessels from HMAS Creswell, in Jervis Bay.

Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night. Midshipman Kerry Francis Marien survived the collision but left the relative safety of his life raft and was last seen swimming towards the rapidly sinking bow of Voyager to search for survivors struggling in the water.

Chief Petty Officer Jonathan "Buck" Rogers was trapped in the forward section of the bow. Realising he was too big to get through the small escape hatches, Buck took charge of trying to help the 50 sailors trapped with him to escape. And when escape was no longer possible, he was heard leading those trapped there in prayers and hymns. There are many stories of heroism from that night, of the brave men of the Royal Australian Navy rising to the occasion to save the lives of shipmates and friends. Stories that we know, and stories we will never know.

"We must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country."

In the years that followed the loss of Voyager , the national conversation was dominated by the controversy. The incident was followed by two royal commissions and many theories and books on how and why such a horrific peacetime loss of life could occur.

It is of course important to understand why Voyager was lost and where accountability lies. Whilst we should never lose sight of the many hard lessons learnt, on the 60th anniversary we should focus our thoughts on the brave sailors who died and those who survived but whose lives were never the same.

The sea is a perilous place; it does not recognise a distinction between wartime and peacetime. Every time our naval ships set sail, they put themselves at the mercy of this unforgiving environment. For centuries, the oceans have rallied against those who seek to tame it, and operating in this environment will always be dangerous. Preparation in this domain for the possibility of conflict requires the women and men of our navy to practise the operations and procedures that they will rely on in wartime. There is always risk, and they embrace it daily.

When we think of our military heroes we talk of those on the Kokoda track and the trials of Gallipoli and the Western front. They all rightfully deserve a place in the collective memory of our nation and remind us of what war really means, especially in this time of global tensions that permeate all aspects of international and national security.

On the anniversary of Voyager 's loss we must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country. They too are our heroes, and they died in the service of our nation.

Article reprinted with permission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's analysis and commentary site The Strategist .

Survivors of the sinking of HMAS Voyager (II), R62222 Engineering Mechanic Michael Garner (Mick) ...

Survivors of the sinking of HMAS Voyager (II), R62222 Engineering Mechanic Michael Garner (Mick) Skidmore (left) and R62196 Engineering Mechanic Robert James (Bob) Johnson, rest on stretchers on the hangar deck while they look at magazines and books on board the RAN aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (II). HMAS Voyager sank on the night of 10 February 1964, the result of a collision with the Melbourne during exercises off Jervis Bay, southern NSW. The disaster claimed the lives of 82 crew members of the Voyager.

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Related information

Period 1960-1969
HMAS Voyager (1957-1964)

Lenore Heath, 60th anniversary of sinking of HMAS Voyager II , Australian War Memorial, 29 January 2024

With many new crew members aboard, HMAS Voyager sailed from Sydney to Jervis Bay on 6 February 1964 for a series of post re-fit trials and exercises with HMAS Melbourne. On the night of 10 February the Melbourne was conducting night flying exercises off the coast of Jervis Bay, with the Voyager undertaking the role of guard escort. It was a moonless night and both ships had only navigational and operational lights in use.

At 8.56pm the ships collided and the Voyager was cut in two. Her forward section passed down the Melbourne’s port side and the after section down the starboard side. The forward section sank soon after the collision and the after section some three hours later. The crew of the Melbourne recovered survivors from the water and the after section of the Voyager. Two RAN search and rescue boats, HMAS Air Nymph and HMAS Air Sprite, set out from shore establishment HMAS Creswell, and the crews succeeded in rescuing 70 men. RAN helicopters and minesweepers were also dispatched to assist with the search for survivors. Of the 314 men aboard HMAS Voyager, 82 died; 14 officers (including the commanding officer), 67 sailors and one civilian dock worker.

The Memorial holds a significant collection of photographs of this incident taken by RAN photographers. After the immediate impact of the collision, HMAS Melbourne photographers hurriedly grabbed cameras and photographed the after section of the Voyager and the rescue efforts. Other photographs record injured and shocked survivors being cared for on the Melbourne, activities aboard the aircraft carrier in light of day and the major damage to the bow of the Melbourne.

You can view more photographs related to this event here in the Collection area of the Memorial’s website.

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HMAS Voyager II

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In 1933 the Admiralty agreed to loan the Flotilla Leader Stuart (I) and four V and W Class destroyers ( Vampire (I), Vendetta (I), Voyager and Waterhen (I)) to the Royal Australian Navy as replacements for the S Class destroyers ( Stalwart , Success , Swordsman , Tasmania and Tattoo ) and the Flotilla Leader Anzac , then due for scrapping. Voyager and the other four ships commissioned in the Royal Australian Navy at Portsmouth on 11 October 1933 to form the Australian Destroyer Flotilla, later to become famous as the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla'. Voyager was commissioned under the command of Lieutenant Commander George Stewart RAN .

The Flotilla departed Chatham, under the command of Captain AC RN (in Stuart (I)), on 17 October 1933 and, proceeding via Suez, reached Singapore on 28 November, Darwin on 7 December and Sydney on 21 December 1933.

The next two years of Voyager 's service followed the normal pattern of a Squadron destroyer in Australian waters. Training exercises, spring cruises, a run to New Zealand in March 1935 and long periods in Sydney Harbour sums up the routine for Voyager in the early 1930s.

On 14 April 1936 Voyager paid off into Reserve to be replaced by Waterhen (I) in the Flotilla. Two years in Reserve at Sydney ended on 26 April 1938 when Voyager recommissioned under the command of Lieutenant Commander James Morrow RAN . Following her recommissioning, Voyager spent most of the remainder of 1938 in Queensland and New South Wales waters.

In October 1938 she arrived in southern waters, reaching Melbourne at the close of the month and returning to Sydney on 10 November. February and March 1939 were spent in Tasmanian waters, followed by exercises in Victorian waters, finally returning to Sydney on 28 April. The months remaining before the outbreak of World War II were spent in Queensland and New South Wales waters.

On 14 October 1939 Stuart (I), Vendetta (I) and Waterhen (I) departed Sydney for Singapore, proceeding via Darwin and Lombok Strait. The same day ( Vampire (I) and Voyager departed Fremantle to join company at Singapore. The Flotilla was under the command of Commander HML Waller RAN (Commander (D)), in Stuart (I).

It had been intended to base the destroyers at Singapore for a period of training but, while the Flotilla was still at sea, it was decided that after a brief stop at Singapore it should proceed to the Mediterranean. The two ships ex Fremantle arrived at Singapore on 21 October 1939 where they were joined on the 29th by Stuart (I), Waterhen ;(I) and Vendetta (I).

The Flotilla sailed from Singapore on 13 November 1939 but split up en route and consequently the ships did not all reach Malta at the same time. Voyager arrived on 24 December 1939. From 2 January 1940 the Flotilla formed the 19th Destroyer Division for service with the Mediterranean Fleet.

At this period of the war, British and French naval supremacy in the Mediterranean called for only routine escort and patrol duties, interspersed with fleet exercises. Nevertheless, the Australian destroyers were kept busy with their routine of escort and patrol work, singly and in pairs, which took them from end to end of the Mediterranean.

Voyager commenced operational service in the Mediterranean escorting convoys from Malta to Marseilles convoys. She sailed from Malta on New Year's Day, 1940, bound for Marseilles. On 11 January 1940 she entered Alexandria Harbour for the first time in World War II, departing the following day escorting a Malta convoy.

In February and March the pattern was much the same and on 24 March Voyager 's crew had their first glimpse of the 'Rock' when they entered Gibraltar to provide screen for the carriers HMS Ark Royal and HMS Glorious en route to Alexandria.

Voyager commenced a refit at Malta on 5 April, spending the remainder of the month in dry dock. Escort duties recommenced on 3 May when she sailed for Alexandria in company with Vendetta (I) and Waterhen (I), escorting HMS Resource to Alexandria. The period of 5 to 20 May saw Voyager almost constantly at sea, on escort patrols and fleet manoeuvres with brief spells in Alexandria. On 20 May she joined the escort of the French warships Tourville and Boulogne en route for Bizerts. May closed with the destroyer back in Alexandria.

On 27 May the 19th Destroyer Division ( Stuart (I), Vampire (I), Voyager , Vendetta (I) and Waterhen (I)) and the 20th Destroyer Division (HM Ships Dainty , Diamond , Decoy and Defender ) combined to form the 10th Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Commander Waller.

The entry of Italy into the war on 10 June 1940 and the collapse of French resistance on the 22 June completely changed the naval situation in the Mediterranean. Formerly, all coastlines were either Allied or neutral, and the Anglo-French fleets were in undisputed command of the seas. Now all coasts except those of Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus in the east, Malta in the centre, and Gibraltar in the west were closed to the Royal Navy. Moreover, the Allies had lost the support of the French fleet, which had provided seven capital ships and nineteen cruisers, and had acquired a new enemy in Italy with her menacing naval potential. Her fleet boasted five battleships, 25 cruisers, 90 destroyers and nearly 100 submarines. It spelt the beginning of a long and bitter struggle for control of the Mediterranean, first against the Italian fleet and Air Force (neither of which proved the menace expected) and later against the much more formidable German Luftwaffe whose dive bombers took grievous toll of British warships before they were finally driven from the skies.

For more than a year the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla' took part in the struggle for possession of the ancient sea route linking east and west.

The Italian submarine fleet represented a formidable threat and it was as a counter weapon that Voyager 's initial role against the Italians took shape. On 13 June 1940, off Alexandria, Voyager contacted and attacked a submarine with two patterns of depth charges. The submarine immediately surfaced and Voyager opened fire forcing it to submerge. More depth charges were dropped, but the submarine, in spite of prolonged attack, escaped. On 17 June in company with Vampire (I) off Alexandria, a second contact was made but a series of attacks again failed to destroy the enemy.

Anti-submarine patrols continued through the hot Mediterranean June days. At sea off Crete on the evening of 27 June and in company with several destroyers of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, the submarine Liuzzi was sighted on the surface. She promptly dived but HM Ships Ilex , Dainty and Decoy soon gained contact and forced her to surface. After a brief exchange of fire between Dainty and Liuzzi the Italian surrendered. Voyager thereupon lowered her whaler and rescued thirteen survivors before the submarine was finally destroyed by gunfire.

Early in the morning of 29 June, at 0505, the anti-submarine group were maintaining patrol west of Crete when a submarine was sighted on the surface. She promptly dived and in spite of depth charge attacks by Voyager , Ilex and Defender , apparently escaped. An hour and a half later, the submarine Uebi Scebeli was sighted on the horizon. Dainty and Ilex closed, attacked and sank her after rescuing survivors. In the evening of the same day the destroyers returned to Alexandria where Voyager landed her prisoners.

On 30 June, the day that Voyager returned to Alexandria from her first brush with the enemy, Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville hoisted his flag in HMS Hood at Gibraltar in command of Force H, hastily constituted to bolster Mediterranean sea power to meet the new threat. It comprised HM Ships Hood , Resolution and Valiant , the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal , the cruiser HMS Arethusa and seven destroyers. After operating against the French fleet at Oran in the first days of July, Admiral Somerville was ordered to attack the west coast of Italy, either Sicily or Sardinia, to create a diversion during the movement of Mediterranean convoys covered by the fleet.

The Mediterranean Fleet sailed from Alexandria on 7 July to cover the Malta to Alexandria convoys and with it sailed three of the Australian destroyers; Stuart (I) screening the 7th Cruiser Squadron and Voyager and ( Vampire (I) on the screen of the battle fleet and HMS Eagle . The following day, 8 July, the fleet was heavily attacked from the air and Voyager began to learn the value of violent evasion tactics. In spite of the enemy effort (some fifty bombs fell near HMS Warspite ), only the cruiser Gloucester sustained a direct hit.

Early on 9 July reconnaissance reports indicated the presence of strong enemy forces including two battleships. At 1510, off the Calabrian coast, Admiral Cunningham's Flagship, Warspite , sighted six enemy 8-inch cruisers and a number of destroyers. Four minutes later Neptune sighted the main Italian battle fleet. At 1520 the Battle of Calabria began.

Voyager 's role throughout the brief inconclusive engagement and the subsequent pursuit of the Italian fleet to within 25 miles of the Calabrian coast, was that of screening destroyer to the carrier Eagle . In the subsequent land based heavy air attacks Voyager continued to screen the carrier. She suffered no damage proving once more how ineffective high level bombing was against the small fast moving target. As Admiral Cunningham commented "high level bombing even on the scale experienced during these operations, yields few hits and is more alarming than dangerous".

The morning of 10 July saw Voyager detach from the fleet for Malta to escort an Alexandria bound convoy. However, there was no respite from the bombers, six heavy attacks developing before the ship entered Alexandria five days later. A brief spell at Alexandria ended on 25 July when she sailed escorting convoy bound for Port Said, then to Malta and back to Alexandria on the last day of July.

The first week of August 1940 was spent in Alexandria followed by the escort of a series of Port Said and Haifa convoys. On 30 August Voyager sailed on the screen of the battle fleet during the passage of Mediterranean reinforcements, HM Ships Valiant , Illustrious , Calcutta and Coventry . After an uneventful cruise, Voyager reached Malta on 2 September where she was under refit until the last day of the month when she proceeded on the screen of the fleet for Alexandria.

The first weeks of October followed the established pattern of convoy escort, screening the fleet, days in Alexandria Harbour and anti-submarine patrols. On 25 October Voyager joined the 1st Battle Squadron (Rear Admiral HB Rawlings) during operations covering the passage of AN5, a Port Said to Dardanelles convoy, including the screening of Eagle for the attack on Maltezana aerodrome, Stampalia. At sea on 28 October her crew were told of the invasion of Greece by Italian forces.

On 29 October Voyager sailed from Alexandria escorting a convoy for Suda Bay in Crete to establish an advanced fuelling base for the reinforcement of Greece. Arriving on 31 October Voyager , Vampire (I) and Waterhen (I) began anti-submarine patrols during net laying operations by HMS Protector . The following day Voyager joined the battle fleet for passage to Alexandria, adding her quota of fire in driving off a series of torpedo bomber attacks en route.

On 5 November she was at sea again escorting a Malta convoy, returning to Alexandria on 13 November to begin nine days of boiler cleaning. The escort of another Malta convoy began on 23 November, the passage being marked by the usual air attack. Three successive torpedo bomber attacks were driven off without damage to the convoy. At 08:00 on 26 November Voyager and convoy entered Malta Harbour. Eight hours later the Australian destroyer was once more at sea, escorting a convoy for Alexandria, where she arrived on 10 November.

December began with convoy to Piraeus in Greece, with Voyager returning to Alexandria 9 December. On this day the British Army under General Wavell began its offensive in the Western Desert. The immediate object of the operations ashore was the destruction of enemy forces contained in the Nibeiwa/Tummae area followed by a northward drive to Sidi Barrani on the coast, thus isolating Maktila Camp which represented the Italian Army's most advanced camp in Egypt. The naval role during the first stage of the operations was to provide harassing fire at Maktila and Sidi Barrani, and this was begun by the monitor Terror and the gunboats HMS Aphis and HMS Ladybird , supported by the destroyers HM Ships Jervis , Janus and Nubian during the night of 8/9 December.

On 10 December Voyager sailed from Alexandria screening the battle fleet ( Barham , Valiant , York and Illustrious ) for the bombardment of Bardia, but were prevented from shelling the Italian positions by low visibility. Bad weather also stopped a projected attack on El Adem airfield by aircraft from Illustrious . On 13 December the fleet returned to Alexandria.

On 14 December Voyager joined the Inshore Squadron screening Terror in the bombardment of Bardia for the following three days. One minor casualty occurred when Voyager was straddled by the Italian shore batteries. Ordered to return to Alexandria late on 17 December, Voyager there embarked half a company of British Commando troops, picked up more troops at Mersa Matruh and landed the entire group at Sollum, which fell to the British forces on 16 December.

During the remainder of December the work of the D10 destroyers ( Vendetta (I), Voyager , Waterhen (I), ( Vampire (I) (Captain D10), Diamond and Wryneck ) supporting the campaign in the Western Desert was confined to patrol and escort duty. On 26 December Waterhen (I) captured the enemy schooner Tireremo Diritto trying to enter Bardia and on 29 December Voyager intercepted the schooner Zingarella engaged in transporting British prisoners of war from Bardia to Tobruk. Dainty also captured two schooners on the night of 21 December.

In January 1941 the Mediterranean Fleet continued operations in support of the Libyan offensive, Operation MC5. On 2 January naval support for the assault on Bardia began when Force W ( Terror , Aphis and Ladybird ) opened harassing fire in preparation for the Australian attack from the south. This was followed by sustained bombardment the following day from the 15-inch armament of Warspite , Valiant and Barham . Two days later Bardia fell, and with it some 25,000 prisoners fell into Allied hands.

Voyager and Dainty represented the 10th Destroyer Flotilla's participation. Voyager (Captain D10) sailed from Alexandria on New Year's Day 1941. On 2 January she supported Force W in the bombardment of Bardia. Afternoon attempts (45 bombs were aimed at Voyager and Terror ) by the Italian Air Force to terminate the bombardment proved as unsuccessful as previous attempts to drive the Navy from the Libyan coast.

Early in the morning of 3 January Voyager joined the battle fleet screen off Sidi Barrani for the full scale bombardment of Bardia. In the ensuing shelling of the Italian positions the battleships engaged the northern sector while Voyager and Dainty engaged shore batteries on both sides of the harbour. On completion of the bombardment Voyager returned to Alexandria to escort a convoy for Sollum before beginning five days boiler cleaning at Alexandria. On 11 January Voyager joined the battle fleet for screening duties during large scale convoy operations.

A new note had sounded in the Mediterranean campaign with the advent of the Luftwaffe. On 10 January German aircraft made their first attacks against the Mediterranean Fleet and showing far greater skill and determination than their Italian allies succeeded in seriously damaging the carrier Illustrious with six direct hits. The following day, 11 January, dive bombers again attacked the fleet, sinking the cruiser Southampton and damaging Gloucester . Thus in two days the Germans caused more damage to the fleet than the Italians in six months of warfare.

Voyager returned to the Libyan coast on 15 January to take up intercept patrols and support to advancing British Forces while Force W ( Terror , Gnat and Ladybird ) continued to harass the enemy. With the fall of Tobruk on 22 January Voyager withdrew to Alexandria, returning five days later on 27 January to resume operations.

In February Voyager continued her Libyan patrols, operating mainly off Tobruk and Benghazi after the capture of the latter port on 6 February. For the forces at sea there was little respite. Air attack, the constant menace to the Inshore Squadron, accounted for the loss of Terror off Derna on 22 February and Dainty , of the 10th Flotilla, off Tobruk two days later. In March German intervention in Greece became an ominous probability and it was decided to reinforce the Greek Army to the limit of capacity. The decision imposed a further heavy commitment on the Mediterranean Fleet with the responsibility of the safe conduct of the convoys.

On 6 March Operation LUSTRE, the reinforcement of Greece, began and Voyager at sea on the screen of the battle fleet covering the first convoys played her small part along with her sister ships and HMAS Perth (I). The troop movements were a continuous operation with convoys at three day intervals from Alexandra with personnel in cruisers and material in merchant vessels. Perth (I) in two lifts transferred 1,221 troops. Voyager , besides operating on the screen of the fleet and on anti-submarine patrol, escorted two Piraeus bound and two Piraeus to Alexandria convoys. En route to Greece on 28 March torpedo bomber attacks failed to damage the convoy or escort, though one torpedo passed uncomfortably close along Voyager 's port side.

Concurrently with the Greek operations the flow of supplies was maintained to the army in the Western Desert. In these operations during March Voyager assisted when she escorted a convoy to Tobruk, leaving Alexandria on 17 March.

April 1941 opened on the 6th with the German invasion of Greece in force. The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean was thus faced with the prospect of further heavy responsibilities. At the same time the Battle of Matapan had been fought and won, ending Italian attempts to intervene at sea with the fleet. As Admiral Cunningham commented "I am glad to think that we were able off Matapan to teach them a lesson which kept them out of the ring for the rest of the year".

Operation LUSTRE continued for the first three weeks of April in the face of mounting air attack by the Luftwaffe. There was only meagre fighter protection for the convoys in the vicinity of Crete and the Piraeus approaches. Thus in spite of the Navy's efforts losses increased. To 18 April twenty-five ships were lost, but only seven in convoy at sea. All but two were empty and south bound and 58,364 troops and their equipment had been safely landed on Greek soil without the loss of a single man.

In common with most of the escorting destroyers, Voyager suffered her share of attack from the air during this period. On 1 April she sailed from Piraeus escorting a convoy of nine ships southward. Attacked by German bombers the following day, two ships, Homefield and Coulourasxenos , were damaged beyond salvage. Voyager rescued the crews of both vessels.

In the Western Desert disaster struck the Allied campaign with the launching of the German counter offensive under Rommel at the beginning of April. Benghazi was lost on 3 April, Bardia on 12 April and by the following day the British Army found itself back on the Egyptian frontier. The Navy, heavily committed, gave what help it could. The Inshore Squadron including Vendetta (I), Waterhen (I) and Stuart (I) endeavoured to harass the enemy and the cruiser Gloucester bombarded Bardia twice. Special efforts were made to prevent men and materials crossing the Mediterranean to bolster the enemy potential.

Voyager 's part in these Libyan harassing operations began on 19 April when she sailed from Alexandria as part of the escort of a force sent to raid Bardia. The troops landed from Glengyle succeeded in demolishing shore dumps and except for 67 men who had to be left behind, safely re-embarked for the return to Alexandria.

On 21 April, the Greek cause lost, it was decided to evacuate the British Forces. In anticipation preparations had been made to set in motion Operation DEMON, the evacuation of Greece. The problems were many and the conditions ashore in Greece chaotic. Excluding the cruiser Gloucester and four destroyers based at Malta, all the light forces of the Mediterranean Fleet were called in to assist.

The evacuation began during the night of 24/25 April 1941 and continued for five nights, with the further rescue of small groups for two more nights. Some 1300 troops were taken out before Operation DEMON began, followed by 16,000 from Raphtis and Nauplia and Raphina, 5750 from Megara, 4320 from Monemvasia and some 19,500 from various points on the coast. At Kalamata, where Perth (I), Phoebe and three destroyers were ordered to embark 8,000 troops, only 450 were rescued. A German column ahead of the main force entered the town, captured the Sea Transport Officer and his staff and so disorganised the evacuation arrangements. Perth (I)'s captain and senior officer was then some ten miles off the coast. Reluctantly he decided to order the force to withdraw. Later that night, however, four destroyers rescued 450 troops from the groups awaiting succour on the beaches to the south east of the town.

Voyager 's part in the evacuation began on the morning of 24 April when she cleared Suda Bay in company with Calcutta , Stuart (I), Salvia and Hyacinth and the transports Glengyle , Glenearn and Ulster Prince . Air attack en route by German Junkers scored one hit on Glenearn . At sunset Phoebe joined the escort and Voyager and Hyacinth detached for Nauplia escorting Ulster Prince where they anchored in the evening, followed an hour later by Phoebe , Stuart (I) and the transport Glenearn .

Shortly before midnight 301 personnel embarked in Voyager , including 160 nursing sisters. Embarkation continued in other ships throughout the night. At 03:50 Glenearn , Phoebe , Stuart (I) and Hyacinth sailed for Suda, followed at 08:07 by Voyager (maintaining an anti-submarine patrol), Perth , Calcutta , Salvia and the transport Glengyle . All ships reached Suda undamaged. The Nauplia lift ended Voyager 's part in the embarkation operations. For remainder of the period she was escorted convoys between Suda Bay and Alexandria.

The setback in Libya was not all on the debit side. In his withdrawal General Wavell decided to attempt to maintain a toehold on the coast. A strong garrison was accordingly established in Tobruk. Aided by the Navy, all the German efforts to dislodge the garrison proved unavailing, in spite of Goebbels' epithet of 'RATS'.

The supply of the beleaguered troops maintained under constant air attack resulted in the organisation of the 'Tobruk Ferry'. The cost at sea was heavy with HMAS Waterhen (I) being one of the victims. Nevertheless the Navy maintained a regular supply averaging 400 tons a day besides reinforcements and the evacuation of the wounded. On 5 May 1941 Voyager made her first contribution to the frustration of the investing German Army when she sailed from Alexandria with troops and ammunition and returned the following day carrying 250 troops.

Voyager now returned to the operations proceeding to the north. Greece was gone but Crete remained in British hands. On 9 May she reached Suda Bay to join Flamingo and Auckland as convoy escort to Alexandria, departing again on 18 May, escorting Glengyle which was carrying reinforcements.

On 23 May the fleet, then operating to prevent sea borne landings in Crete, was ordered to withdraw towards Alexandria after losing the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji and four destroyers, Juno , Greyhound , Kelly and Kashmir . On the previous day Voyager joined the screen of the 1st Battle Squadron after searching for survivors from Fiji .

On 27 May, on the eve of the evacuation, Voyager detached and entered Alexandria to begin operations to Tobruk. The 'Tobruk Ferry' occupied Voyager throughout June 1941. Five runs were made from Alexandria to Tobruk and return. Another five voyages were made from Mersa Matruh to Tobruk and return. On 29 June she reached Alexandria for docking, a weary ship trembling in every plate.

Voyager 's Mediterranean service was now drawing to a close. On 12 July she made one last run to Tobruk. She experienced engine trouble and limped into Alexandria the following day. It marked the end of eighteen months service under constant pressure.

On 24 July Voyager cleared Alexandria Harbour for the last time en route for Australia. She arrived in Sydney on 25 September 1941 after an absence of 751 days. She was placed in refit which was completed on 3 March 1942.

Following a period of post refit trials and exercises, Voyager commenced her first operational duty of the Pacific War on 19 April 1942 when she escorted HMT Queen Elizabeth on the east coast. Further coastal escort duties followed before post refit defects required her to dock in Sydney. This occupied most of May.

Voyager arrived in Fremantle on 6 June 1942 and was based there for a short period as an escort destroyer. On 25 August 1942 she arrived in Darwin, where many of her crew had their first acquaintance with hostile aircraft.

Voyager was based at Darwin in September. On 22 September she embarked 250 reinforcements for the Timor guerrilla forces and sailed for Betano Bay with the intention of landing the troops at last light and then withdrawing.

During disembarkation operations the following night, 23 September, Voyager ran aground on the beach in Betano Bay. At 12:45 the next day she was sighted by a Japanese reconnaissance bomber escorted by a fighter. Defiant to the end she shot down the bomber, but since the inevitable following attack was expected it was decided to abandon ship. The first of a series of bombing raids began mid afternoon, such that by the evening there was no alternative but to detonate demolition charges, thereby destroying the ship. On 25 September HMA Ships Kalgoorlie and Warrnambool (I) safely evacuated Voyager 's ship's company.

On 4 November 1999, the RAN 's Hydrographic Office Detached Survey Unit (HODSU) reestablished the location of the wreck of Voyager using a Klein side scan sonar while conducting a survey of Betano beach in support of INTERFET operations in East Timor. Little of the wreck remains and what does is exposed at low tide.

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HMAS Voyager II Shipwreck

The tragic sinking of HMAS Voyager (II) after a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (II) off Jervis Bay in 1964 remains Australia's worst peacetime naval disaster. The controversial incident saw Voyager cut in two, with the loss of 82 lives, and 232 survivors rescued from the sea. The final resting place of the Voyager (II) has yet to be found, but it is considered one of NSW most significant wrecks. On the 50th anniversary of the sinking a commemoration service was held close to the last known location of the wreck at sea. The NSW Office of Environment and Heritage in collaboration with the Marine National Facility have been actively searching for the wreck. Once located, the site will be nominated as a Historic Shipwreck for its social values under the NSW Heritage Act 1977. More significantly, the wreckage sites will form a focal point for relatives and friends to grieve and acknowledge the service and sacrifice of those onboard. This incident highlights that the social significance of a wreck is often as important as its archaeological remains.

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In 2014, the Australian National Maritime Museum (ANMM) received reports from recreational divers that the shipwreck site of HMAS PERTH (I) was being systematically salvaged by commercial divers. After extensive discussions with Indonesian Government departments and agencies the ANMM led the first Australian / Indonesian remote sensing survey of PERTH in December 2016. This was followed by an in-water survey in May 2017. These investigations revealed PERTH had been devastated by systematic, large-scale unauthorized salvage. Following the survey, ANMM and its Indonesian research partner PUSAT PENELITIAN ARKEOLOGI NASIONAL (ARKENAS), working in conjunction with the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, successfully lobbied the Indonesian Government to have the site declared Indonesia's first Marine Protected Area.

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The Tragic Blunder! The fate of the HMAS Australia - Guardian of the Southern Seas On 12 April 1924, the former HMAS Australia, the largest warship in the Australian fleet was towed 50km east of Sydney Heads and scuttled with full military honours. Eulogies were read, strong naval men were wet eyed and public outrage flared at the loss of the first flagship of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). This highly significant vessel was Australia's only battlecruiser, was the grandmother/ centrepiece of the Royal Australian Naval Fleet, and prevented German aggression in the South Pacific during World War I. The wreck lay undisturbed for many years until its accidental discovery in 400m of water 1990. However, due to its extreme depth, a survey was not undertaken of the site until the RAN (at the request of the Heritage Branch) directed a suitable deep water ROV unit (US CURV) to undertake the first photographic survey of the site in 2007. This paper presents a potted history of this vessel which led to its sinking, along with the survey results and analyses which have documented key diagnostic elements of this, Australia's largest protected Historic Shipwreck.

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HMAS Perth was one of three modified Leander Class Light Cruisers taken into the Royal Australian Navy at the beginning of World War Two. In February 1942 the light cruiser along with the heavy cruiser USS Houston encountered a Japanese invasion fleet off western Java and were sunk with heavy casualties. Perth was discovered by an Australian wreck diver in 1967 and over the next 30 years became a popular recreational / technical dive site. In late 2013 technical divers reported to the Australian Government that the wreck of HMAS Perth was being targeted by commercial salvage activity. This paper examines the role of the Australian National Maritime Museum and Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional (Indonesia) in surveying the site and attempting to get it protected under Indonesian cultural heritage law.

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In the context of Queensland's rich and diverse maritime history one of the most strategic and historically significant areas is the Torres Strait. Its importance was of course paramount not only to Torres Strait Islanders, but to transient seafarers and to those who ventured into these waters to exploit their rich marine resources. Such application has left its traces, particularly during the last 200 years of European occupation of Australia. This paper presents the outcome of 2 maritime archaeological survey expeditions to Torres Strait and the far northern Great Barrier Reef Wreck reports were initially compiled from written records and from verbal accounts by local residents. Based on this information, as well as on familiarity with local operational conditions and constraints, 23 wreck sites were selected for investigation and assessment. Where wreckage was located, its position was accurately determined using the differential global positioning system (DGPS). The site was...

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HMAS Voyager survivors commemorate maritime disaster's 60th anniversary off Jervis Bay

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HMAS Voyager II

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OPINION | HMAS Voyager (II): remembering the 82 fallen, and so many who would never be the same again

"Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night."

"We must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country."

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Survivors of the sinking of HMAS Voyager (II), R62222 Engineering Mechanic Michael Garner (Mick) ...

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Lenore Heath, 60th anniversary of sinking of HMAS Voyager II , Australian War Memorial, 29 January 2024

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