kalibr pl cruise missiles

In-depth Analysis of 3M Series Kalibr Cruise Missiles

From the russian inventory, an in-depth analysis of 3m series kalibr cruise missiles reveals their remarkable characteristics as advanced, long-range, precision-strike weapons primarily designed for launch from naval platforms, including submarines, surface ships, and coastal defence systems. these missiles have garnered significant attention and acclaim due to their exceptional versatility, unwavering accuracy, and their extensive capability to engage a wide range of targets. operating under the nato reporting names ss-n-27 sizzler and ss-n-30a, this family of russian cruise missiles has been ingeniously developed by the prestigious npo novator design bureau..

Among the well-known variants, the 3M-14 Kalibr-K stands out as it is predominantly utilized by submarines and boasts an estimated range of 2,500 kilometres ( 1,553 miles ). This impressive range empowers the Russian Navy to effectively strike targets located deep inland throughout Central/Western Europe. This family of cruise missiles, similar to the American Tomahawk, first came into service in 1994. The range of subsonic versions is larger than that of supersonic ones. Additionally, some versions incorporate a second propulsion stage that initiates a supersonic sprint in the terminal approach to the target, thereby reducing the time available for the target’s defence systems to react.

The missile possesses the capability to carry either a thermonuclear warhead or an explosive payload weighing up to 500 kilograms ( 1,100 lb ). These missiles are frequently launched in salvos, which involve firing multiple missiles simultaneously. This strategic approach allows for coordinated attacks, significantly increases the likelihood of target destruction, and poses challenges to enemy defences. The 3M series Kalibr missiles employ a combination of guidance systems to ensure accurate targeting. They utilize inertial navigation systems, satellite guidance, and mid-course updates to adjust their trajectory and reach the intended target. Some variants may also incorporate terminal active radar homing or electro-optical seekers to enhance precision during the final stages of flight.

The Concept Behind the Development of the 3M Series Kalibr Cruise Missiles:

The development of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles began in the late 1990s by the Novator Design Bureau, with the goal of creating versatile and effective naval cruise missiles for the Russian military. These missiles incorporated advanced technologies, such as reduced radar cross-section and low observable characteristics, enhancing their ability to evade enemy defences. Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability on newly designed submarines, corvettes, frigates, and larger surface ships, providing even modest platforms with significant offensive capability.

With the land attack missile , these platforms can engage distant fixed-ground targets using conventional warheads. Extensive testing and evaluation were conducted to verify the performance and reliability of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles, including land-based and sea-based tests to assess flight characteristics, range, accuracy, and effectiveness against various targets.

Over time, the development efforts resulted in the production of different variants of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles, each optimized for specific launch platforms and mission requirements. These variants included versions for submarines, surface ships, coastal defence systems , and even air-launched variants for deployment on Russian strategic bombers .

An In-Depth Analysis of the Kalibr Cruise Missile Design:

The Kalibr cruise missile design is a state-of-the-art sophisticated system of the latest generation that incorporates various technological advancements to achieve its capabilities.

Airframe and Propulsion: The Kalibr cruise missile features a streamlined airframe designed to minimize drag and increase aerodynamic efficiency. The sleek cylindrical shape reduces radar cross-section . The airframe is typically constructed using composite materials to ensure strength while keeping the overall weight low. The missile is propelled by a multi-stage solid-fuel rocket motor for the 91RE1/RTE2 versions, which provides high thrust and acceleration, and a turbojet engine for the 3M-54/E/TE/E1/TE1, 3M-14/E/TE versions. The propulsion system allows the missile to achieve the required speeds for efficient cruising and manoeuvring during flight.

Guidance and Navigation: The Kalibr cruise missile utilizes an advanced guidance and navigation system to ensure precise targeting. Some variants may incorporate terminal guidance capabilities, such as active radar homing or electro-optical seekers, to enhance accuracy during the final stage of the mission. When approaching the intended target, both the Russian domestic variant ( 3M54T / 3M54K ) and export variants ( 3M54TE / 3M54KE ) are capable of achieving supersonic speeds ( Mach 3.0 ) while maintaining sub-sonic speeds. These missiles also possess exceptional manoeuvrability, executing high-angled defensive manoeuvres that deviate from the typical linear flight path observed in other anti-ship cruise missiles .

To autonomously navigate during flight, the missile relies on an inertial navigation system (INS). This INS employs gyroscopes and accelerometers to accurately measure changes in velocity and direction. Additionally, the missile incorporates terminal active radar homing. Furthermore, satellite-based navigation systems like GLONASS, the Russian global navigation satellite system, are employed for precise positioning and mid-course phase updates. The incredible terminal speed of these missiles poses a significant challenge for modern defence systems attempting to repel them, and their remarkable precision renders them highly lethal against mobile targets such as destroyers.

Versions and Launch Platforms: The missile comprises five modular versions: two for anti-shipping purposes, one for land attack, and two for anti-submarine operations. The design of the missile allows for shared components between surface-launched and submarine-launched variants, although each missile possesses distinct elements, such as the booster. When launched from a surface ship, the missile can utilize a vertical launching system (VLS) and is equipped with a booster featuring thrust vectoring capability. Conversely, when launched from a submarine’s torpedo tube, the missile does not require such an addition but instead employs a conventional booster. As for the air-launched version , it is enclosed within a container that is subsequently released as the missile launches, effectively separating from the container.

The ‘Club-K’ is a Russian container complex of missile weapons that are housed in standard 20- and 40-foot sea containers . This system is specifically designed to engage surface and ground targets effectively. The versatile nature of the complex allows it to be installed on shorelines, vessels of various classes, rail platforms, and trucks. It is essentially a modified version of the Kalibr missile system. In 2010, a variant of the Club-K was introduced, which features a clever disguise as a shipping container.

This containerized variant can be easily placed on trucks, trains, or merchant vessels. The Club-K in a shipping container form was publicly showcased for the first time at the MAKS 2011 air show. By incorporating the launcher system within a standard shipping container, the missiles can be transported and stored discreetly without raising suspicion. This covert capability poses significant challenges for pre-emptive strikes against the launcher, as its true nature and intent remain well-concealed.

Naval application: The Kalibr missiles are launched from various Russian submarines, including the Kilo class, Lada class, Amur class, Akula class, Yasen class, and Borei class. Additionally, low displacement platforms equipped with the Kalibr system include the Russian Gremyashchy class, Buyan-M class, the second batch of Steregushchy class corvettes, and the Karakurt class. Russian frigates of the Gepard, Admiral Gorshkov, and Admiral Grigorovich classes are also capable of carrying these missiles. Furthermore, the Indian Talwar class frigate serves as another ship-borne launch platform for the Club missile system. There are indications that a variant for air launch may be developed to arm the Tu-142s , which are currently deployed by the Russian Navy.

Range and Performance: The range of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles varies depending on the specific variant and launch platform. The widely recognized variant, known as the 3M-14/3M-14T, boasts an estimated range of approximately 1,500 to 2,500 kilometres ( 932 to 1,553 miles ). This particular variant finds primary use on surface ships and submarines. On the other hand, the 3M-54 Kalibr and 3M-54E Kalibr variants also referred to as Klub, possess a range of around 220 to 300 kilometres ( 137 to 186 miles ) and are typically deployed for land-attack missions.

According to a state television news broadcast on 11th October 2015, the production of the Kalibr-PL missile, a submarine-specific derivative of the 3M14TE Kalibr-NK, commenced in 2012. This version boasts specifications including a top speed of Mach 3, a range of 4,000 kilometres, and the ability to operate in various environments: air, land, water, and underwater. The missile has a minimum operating height above the terrain of 10 meters, with an average height ranging from 20 to 50 meters ( up to 1000 m ).

It features automatic terrain following and in-flight controllability, allowing it to perform 147 or more manoeuvres in any direction. The design bureau has enhanced the targeting system of the Kalibr cruise missile, enabling it to execute time-sensitive attacks over extended distances from both ships and submarines.

Warhead placement: The 3M series Kalibr missiles are equipped with various types of warheads depending on their intended targets. Anti-ship variants, like the 3M-54E, commonly utilize a high-explosive fragmentation warhead specifically designed to cause substantial damage to surface ships. Land-attack variants, such as the 3M-14, utilize a conventional warhead with an estimated weight of approximately 450 kilograms (992 pounds). Moreover, the 3M-14/3M-14T versions can be equipped with either a thermonuclear or conventional warhead in domestic land-attack variants.

Testing and Evaluation: Since its inception in 1994, the Kalibr cruise missile has undergone extensive testing and evaluation during the development and production phases. The testing process encompasses ground-based trials, flight tests, and live-fire exercises to validate its performance, reliability, and accuracy. The missile’s flight characteristics, range, accuracy, and lethality are assessed under various operational conditions and scenarios. Notably, during the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, the Kalibr missile was utilized to neutralize key targets, providing an opportunity to thoroughly evaluate its overall performance and missile characteristics.

Variant Configurations: Exploring the Different Versions of the 3M Series Kalibr Cruise Missiles

The 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles have various variant configurations that cater to different launch platforms and mission requirements. Let’s explore the different versions of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles in more detail:

Russian variants _

• 3M54K: The 3M54K is a submarine-launched anti-shipping variant designed specifically for deployment by the Russian Navy. It is widely known and extensively used. The missile has a length of 8.22 meters ( 27.0 feet ) and is equipped with a 200 kg (440 lb) warhead. Its estimated range is between 550 and 660 kilometres ( 340-410 miles ). The 3M54K is a sea-skimmer missile that maintains a final stage flight altitude of 4.6 meters ( 15 feet ) and achieves a supersonic terminal speed of Mach 2.9 ( 3,550 km/h; 2,210 mph ).
• 3M54T: The 3M54T is an anti-shipping variant deployed by the Russian Navy on surface ships. It is launched using a Vertical Launch System (VLS) and features a thrust vectoring booster. The missile measures 8.9 meters (29 feet) in length. It shares the same warhead weight and performance characteristics as the 3M-54K variant.
• 3M14K (SS-N-30A): The 3M14K is an inertial guidance land attack variant deployed by the Russian Navy. This submarine-launched weapon has a base length of 6.2 meters (20 feet) and is equipped with a 450-kilogram (990-pound) warhead. With a range of 2,500 kilometres (1,600 miles), it enables the Russian Navy to target locations throughout Central/Western Europe from beyond the GIUK gap. The missile achieves a subsonic terminal speed of Mach 0.8.
• 3M14T: The 3M14T is the inertial guidance land attack variant deployed by the Russian Navy. It is a surface ship-launched missile with a vertical launching system (VLS) and a thrust vectoring booster. The missile has a basic length of 8.9 meters (29 feet), and its warhead weight and other performance characteristics are identical to those of the 3M14K.
• Kalibr-M: The Kalibr-M is a new version of the Kalibr missile system that features a larger warhead and an extended range of up to 4,500 kilometres (2,796 miles). Currently, the ship-launched, submarine-launched, air-launched, and land-launched versions of the Kalibr-M are under development.

Export Variants: The export models are designated under the Club category.

• 3M-54E: is the submarine-launched anti-shipping variant. It has a basic length of 8.2 m (27 ft) and is equipped with a 200 kg warhead. The range of this variant is 300 km. It operates as a sea skimmer, reaching a supersonic terminal speed of Mach 3.0 and maintaining a flight altitude of 4.6 meters (15 ft) during its final stage.
• 3M-54E1: is a submarine-launched anti-shipping variant. It has a basic length of 6.2 m (20 ft) and is equipped with a 200 kg (440 lb) warhead. The range of this variant is 300 km (190 mi). It operates as a sea skimmer, with a subsonic terminal speed of Mach 0.8.
• 3M-14E: is an inertially guided land attack variant launched from a submarine. It has a basic length of 6.2 m (20 ft) and is equipped with a 450 kg (990 lb) warhead. The range of this variant is 300 km (190 mi). It operates at a subsonic terminal speed of Mach 0.8.
• 3M-54TE: is a surface vessel-launched anti-shipping variant equipped with VLS (Vertical Launch System) and a thrust vectoring booster. Its basic length is 8.9 m. It shares the same warhead weight and performance characteristics as the 3M-54E variant. However, its range is shorter compared to the 3M-54. It operates as a sea skimmer with a supersonic terminal speed and a flight altitude of 15 feet (4.6 m) during its final stage. At that stage, it achieves a speed of Mach 3 and has a range of 220 km (140 mi) at supersonic speed.
• 3M-54TE1: is a surface ship-launched anti-shipping variant equipped with VLS (Vertical Launch System) and a thrust vectoring booster. It has a basic length of 8.9 m (29 ft), and its warhead weight and other performance characteristics are identical to the 3M-54E1 variant. It operates as a sea skimmer with a subsonic terminal speed of 0.8 Mach.
• 3M-14TE: is an inertially guided land attack variant. It is launched from a surface ship with VLS (Vertical Launch System) and features a thrust vectoring booster. The basic length of the missile is 8.9 m (29 ft), and its warhead weight and other performance characteristics are identical to the 3M-14E variant. The missile operates at a subsonic terminal speed of 3.0 Mach, with a range of 300 km (190 mi) at supersonic speed.

The land-based anti-ship variant 3M-54E2 and the land-attack variant 3M-14E1 are part of a self-propelled missile system designed for coastal defence. Both missile variants in the system arsenal have a weight of 1,700 kg and are equipped with a 450 kg warhead. They are capable of achieving a flight speed of 240 m/s. According to the manufacturer, NPO Mash, when operating in land-attack mode, the system has a Circular Error Probable ( CEP ) of 50 m in the export version.

Club-A _ ( It is intended to be launched from bombers such as Tu-22M3 , Tu-160 , and Tu-95 )

• The 3M-54AE is an air-launched anti-ship derivative of the missile. It consists of two phases and achieves supersonic speed at the end. The missile weighs 1950 kilograms and is equipped with a 200-kilogram warhead. It has a range of 300 kilometres.
• The 3M-14AE is an air-launched land attack variant specifically designed for aerial operations. It operates at a subsonic speed and utilizes INS+satellite guidance for precise targeting. The missile has a length of 6.2 meters and weighs 1400 kilograms. It is equipped with a 450-kilogram warhead and has a range of 300 kilometres.

These variant configurations of the 3M series Kalibr cruise missiles offer adaptability and versatility for various launch platforms and mission scenarios. They provide Russia with the capability to engage a wide range of targets, including both land-based and surface targets, from submarines, surface ships, and potentially strategic bombers. It is worth noting that the Kalibr missile family may include additional versions or upgraded configurations that have been developed or may be developed in the future. These variants reflect the continuous efforts of the Russian military to enhance its cruise missile capabilities and maintain a credible strategic deterrent.

Operational Triumphs of the Kalibr Cruise Missile:

Combat Operations in Syria: The Kalibr cruise missile made its combat debut during the Russian military intervention in Syria from 2015 until 2018. Russian naval vessels, including submarines and surface ships in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas, launched Kalibr missiles against targets in Syria. The missiles were used to strike various targets, including terrorist infrastructure, command centres, ammunition depots, and militant positions. The Kalibr cruise missiles showcased their precision and long-range capabilities, enabling Russia to effectively strike targets in Syria from significant distances.

Combat Operations in Ukraine: February 2022 – Present (June 2023): Kalibr cruise missiles have been extensively utilized by Russian forces since the commencement of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022. The initial offensive reportedly involved a minimum of 30 cruise missiles, which targeted command and control centres, air bases, and air defence batteries. The missiles were likely launched from the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s corvettes, frigates, and Kilo-class submarines. It is estimated that this resulted in the destruction of approximately 80% of Ukraine’s energy sector as of 2023.

Technical Specifications Of The Kalibr Cruise Missile :

• Weight :  the Kalibr cruise missile varies across different variants, ranging from 1,300 kg to 1,780 kg to 2,300 kg
• Length :  Varies on the variant, from 6.2 m to 8.9 m
• Diameter :  21 inches
• Wingspan:  8 ft ( 2.43 m )
• Warhead :  high explosive (HE) or thermonuclear warhead weighing between 400–500 kg
• Detonation :  Various impact fuze options
• Engine :  Missile utilizes a multi-stage solid-fuel rocket booster to achieve the required altitude and speed. Afterwards, a turbojet engine is initiated for variants such as 3M-54/E/TE/E1/TE1 and 3M-14/E/TE. However, the 91RE1/RTE2 versions rely solely on solid-fuel rockets for propulsion
• Range :  91RE1: 50 km, 3M-54/3M-54T: 660 km (domestic anti-ship version , estimate) 3M-14/3M-14T: 1,500–2,500 km (domestic land-attack version, estimate) 3M-54E (export anti-ship version): 220 km 3M-54E1/3M-14E (export anti-ship version): 300 km Kalibr-M (under development): 4,500 km
• Flight altitude:   50–150 meter AGL(above ground level) And 20 meter over water
• Flight ceiling: max 1,000 meters AGL
• Speed :  Varies on the variant, from 0.8–2.5–3.0 Mach
• Guidance system :  Inertial guidance plus terminal active radar homing, by GPS
• Launch Platform:  naval ships, submarines, containers, bombers & TEL( transporter erector launcher)

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In conclusion, the Kalibr cruise missile is a highly advanced weapon system that has demonstrated remarkable operational success. It incorporates cutting-edge features such as a streamlined airframe, efficient propulsion, advanced guidance systems, and versatile warhead options. The missile can be launched from submarines, surface ships, and potentially strategic bombers, offering operational flexibility in diverse mission scenarios. In addition to Russia, countries such as Algeria, Vietnam, China, Iran, and India also operate this system.

During combat operations in Syria, the Kalibr cruise missile showcased its precision, long-range capabilities, and effectiveness against various targets. Its extended range and stealthy characteristics enhance its ability to engage targets discreetly. With reduced collateral damage, the missile serves as a formidable tool for power projection, deterrence, and precise strikes. The Kalibr cruise missile has become a critical asset in Russia’s naval strike capabilities, underscoring the ongoing advancements in missile technology for modern warfare.

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• Missiles of the World

3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A)

The 3M14 Kalibr (NATO: SS-N-30A) is a Russian land attack cruise missile (LACM) and improved version of the 3M-14E “Club” LACM. The SS-N-30A has an estimated range of around 1,500 to 2,500 km and has become a mainstay in the Russian Navy’s ground-strike capabilities.

Kalibr (SS-N-30A) at a Glance

Kalibr Development

Although commonly referred to as the Kalibr cruise missile in media reports, the SS-N-30A is in fact just one part of the larger Kalibr family of Russian sea-launched missiles, which includes the SS-N-27 (Sizzler) anti-ship cruise missile and the 91R anti-submarine missile. All three Kalibr missiles share common Kalibr vertical launch system (VLS) tubes, which are quickly becoming a mainstay of the Russian Navy’s cruise missile launch capabilities. According the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, a “high ranking Russia defense industry official” said of Kalibr system in 2011:

“Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability on all new design construction nuclear and non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, and larger surface ships. KALIBR provides even modest platforms, such as corvettes, with significant offensive capability and, with the use of the land attack missile, all platforms have a significant ability to hold distant fixed ground targets at risk using conventional warheads. The proliferation of this capability within the new Russian Navy is profoundly changing its ability to deter, threaten or destroy adversary targets. It can be logically assumed that KALIBR capability will be retrofitted on those larger Soviet legacy ships and submarines that undergo major overhauls and/or modernization.” 1

Service History

Export variants.

• Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (Office of Naval Intelligence, December 2015): 33, http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015print.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-082038-923.
• Christopher P. Cavas, “Is Caspian Sea Fleet a Game-Changer?” Defense News , October 11, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/10/11/caspian-sea-russia-navy-missiles-attack-strike-military-naval-syria-frigate-corvette-lcs-littoral-combat-ship/73671188/
• USNORTHCOM and NORAD Posture Statement: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces House of Representatives, 114th Cong, 2 (April 14, 2016) (statement by Admiral William E. Gortney, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20160414/104621/HHRG-114-AS29-Wstate-GortneyB-20160414.pdf
• Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia conducts war games involving numerous missile launches,” Associated Press, October 30, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/10/30/russia-holds-war-games-involving-numerous-missile-launches
• Janes’s Weapons, Naval 2012-2013 (Janes Information Group, 2012), 15.
• “Russia Beefs Up Baltic Fleet Amid NATO Tensions: Reports”, Reuters, October 26, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defence-baltic-sweden-idUSKCN12Q1HB.

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3M-54 Kalibr: Is Russia’s Most Advanced Cruise Missile Being Wasted in Ukraine?

The current war between Russia and Ukraine has seen a wide variety of sophistication in the weaponry on both sides. Although the Russians seem to have enjoyed the most success where they concentrate great numbers of such relatively simple but deadly weapons as tanks and artillery, they have also made considerable use of the most technologically advanced items in their arsenal.

These are the 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missile and its various derivatives.   

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History of the Kalibr

The 3M-54 Kalibr was developed by the Novator Design Bureau in 1994 as a counter to the American Tomahawk cruise missile and has been under production in various forms ever since. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization codenames it the SS-N-27 Sizzler.

Kalibrs launched from warships in the Mediterranean Sea were extensively used during the Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War between October 2015 and December 2018.

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The kalibr’s stats.

With a length of 8.9 meters (29 feet) and a diameter of 5.33 meters (17.5 feet), the basic Kalibr is a multistage, solid-fuel turbojet with a modular propulsion system to accommodate five versions: two anti-ship, two anti-submarine and one for land targets. Depending on size, performance and launching platform, the other variants go under such designations as 3M14 Biryuza (“turquoise”), 3M-14T Kalibr-NK and 3M-14K Kalibr-PL. More advanced versions are still under development, to improve “combat efficiency.”   

Existing variants are capable of being fired from warships as small as a corvette, from submarines and from land vehicles. All use vertical launch systems. They reach their targets through a combination of inertial guidance plus terminal active radar homing, although more current variants have been modified to use satellite signals using a DSMAC (digital scene matching area correlator).

Range varies from 220 to 2,500 kilometers (140 to 1,550 miles), depending on whether the second propulsion stage is driving the warhead at a supersonic sprint or cruising along at subsonic speed for greater range.

The missile can carry from 400 to 500 kilograms (880 to 1,100 pounds) of high explosive or a nuclear warhead at Mach 0.8, 2.5 or 3.

The Kalibr in UKraine

After Syria, the next major usage of the Kalibr came on Feb. 24, 2022, when some 30 missiles helped herald the “special operation” in Ukraine. Above the cacophony of guns, the cruise missiles turn up from time to time in incidents that make the international news.  

Between June 25 and 26, 60 to 80 missiles were launched, of which 30 were aimed at Zhytomir, 10 of which were shot down short of their targets by Ukrainian defenses. On July 14, three Kalibrs hit the city center of Vinnytsia, killing about 20 people — three of them children. Ukraine reported that its defenses shot down two more of the missiles. On July 23, Maria Zakharova of the Russian Telegram reported that “Kalibr missiles destroyed military infrastructure in the port of Odesa, with a high-precision strike.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly denied that the Russian strikes had involved any tactical precision. 

The Russian military pays a price for the Kalibr’s capabilities, since each missile costs an average of $6.5 million each. Up for debate amid a war that has entered its sixth month is whether Russia’s most advanced missile is indeed being guided to vital military targets or simply joining the general barrage of roughly aimed ordnance, wasting its primary asset. Each side has its own appraisal, but the truth will ultimately be revealed over the battlefield.  

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Russian Navy to upgrade vessels with Kalibr cruise missiles

MOSCOW — Russia plans to equip several Navy vessels using Kalibr missiles, a weapon with which one naval policy expert predicts the country will more widely arm its fleet.

Russia recently attacked Ukraine using Kalibr cruise missiles, among other projectiles.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Tuesday the future Lada-class submarine Kronstadt, which is under construction, will be able to fire Kalibr cruise missiles . That same day, state-run news agency Tass reported the corvette Steregushchiy will receive a new Kalibr-NK missile system during modernization work at the Kronstadt Marine Plant.

And Mikhail Budnichenko, CEO of the shipyard Sevmash, said earlier this month the nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov will be armed with Kalibr-NK missiles, following repairs and modernization work.

Submarine construction

The keel laying of the diesel-electric submarine Kronstadt took place in 2005, but construction was suspended. It resumed in 2013 and is ongoing, after which the boat will join the Northern Fleet .

The transfer to the fleet was planned in 2019, but was postponed several times due to noncompliance with Defence Ministry requirements. The fleet will likely take delivery of the boat this year, according to the Russian naval policy expert, who spoke to Defense News on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

The submarine is expected to have a launcher that can hold 10 Кalibr missiles.

“Thanks to the Kalibr missiles, submarines will be able to hit not only land and sea targets, but also submarines,” the expert said.

Defense industry experts in 2017 estimated the cost of the Lada-class sub at $350 million, but increased the approximation to $700 million in 2018.

Corvette update

The corvette Steregushchiy was produced under the shipbuilding program dubbed Project 20380. It and the other ships made under that effort were equipped with the Uran anti-ship missile system, which consists of two four-container, inclined launchers with an ammunition set of eight Kh-35U missiles.

Now the lead ship of its class, the Steregushchiy — constructed 17 years ago — is undergoing a midlife update, during which it will receive a universal shipborne firing complex 3S14. That technology will allow the vessel to launch Kalibr missiles and, eventually, hypersonic Zircon missiles.

“The next ships of this class will also receive Kalibr missiles in the course of their modernization,” the naval expert said.

In an interview with a corporate newspaper, the CEO of the Kronstadt Marine Plant, Anatoly Beloev, said modernization of the Project 20380 corvette will not begin until the end of the spring or the beginning of the summer. By that time the plant is required to hand over a large landing ship to the Defence Ministry, which would make room for new projects. The timeline for the modernization work is not yet determined, Beloev said.

Per annual reports from the shipyard Severnaya Verf, which makes corvettes, it appears the cost of such as vessel in 2016 was 17-29 billion roubles (U.S. $224-382 million).

Warship work

The nuclear missile battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov has undergone repairs and modernization since 2013. More than 150 enterprises have participated in the effort.

Last year, the installation of systems and equipment took place. The cruiser is currently at the outfitting quay, and it will begin trials in the spring of 2023, Budnichenko told a corporate magazine.

Delivery to the Navy was postponed several times, and the service is now expected to receive the ships in 2024.

As part of the modernization effort, the ship will carry 10 3S14 launchers, with eight Kalibr-NK cruise missiles in each, instead of 20 heavy supersonic Granit missiles.

In total, there will be 80 attack missiles on the vessel — a record number for the Russian surface fleet, according to the naval expert.

The Kalibr missile family is made up of several variants, including long–range cruise missiles and anti-submarine torpedoes. Russia decided as far back as the 1990s to equip naval platforms with the weapon.

Almost all newly built and most upgraded units receive this system, the naval expert said.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Maxim Starchak is a Russia correspondent for Defense News. He previously worked as an editor for the Russian Defence Ministry and as an expert for the NATO Information Office in Moscow. He has covered Russian nuclear and defense issues for the Atlantic Council, the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Royal United Services Institute and more.

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What to know about the long-range cruise missile Russia says it fired

Russian naval forces launched long-range cruise missiles on Tuesday evening from the waters off Sevastopol, a port city in Russia-held Crimea, according to expert analysis of video verified by The Washington Post.

Russia said the 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile attack destroyed a major Ukrainian arsenal.

Understanding the weapons that have drawn the world’s attention since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

A v ideo filmed by a witness from the Sevastopol waterfront on Tuesday shows at least four projectiles being fired from the water. Geolocation of the video by The Post shows the missiles appear to be traveling northwest, away from the city. As the narrator recites the date and location, the camera pans to show his surroundings.

“We thought it was a plane flying,” the narrator says. “It’s normal that planes fly here. But shooting is something serious.”

Additional video filmed around the same time shows eight flares with long tails that appear to be airborne missiles flying over the Black Sea. Both videos were verified by The Post.

Footage shared by the Russian defense ministry on social media shows large fireballs emanating from a warship where the ministry said Russian forces had fired Kalibr cruise missiles toward military assets in Orzhev, a village outside of the city of Rivne. Rivne is located more than 200 miles west of Kyiv and would be within the range a 3M-14 Kalibr missile could travel if it was fired from Sevastopol.

The tightly cropped video first shows multiple large explosions in succession above a ship, while someone off camera counts, “First, second, third, fourth.” The video then cuts to a wider view of a sunset where the long tails of the eight missiles are visible. The Post was not able to verify the location of this launch.

What you need to know about hypersonic missiles, which Biden says Russia used against Ukraine

Video reportedly of a Russian Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship launching 8 Kalibr-NK cruise missiles from near Sevastopol. https://t.co/GcWqUpoXLh pic.twitter.com/VvU3l5yYCK — Rob Lee (@RALee85) March 22, 2022

“As a result of the strike, a large depot of weapons and military equipment of the Ukrainian troops, including those received from Western countries, was destroyed,” a statement on the ministry’s Telegram channel said.

U.S. officials said they could not confirm that the weapons had been used. Ukrainian authorities have not confirmed the deployment of the missiles or the destruction of an arsenal near Rivne.

The Post could not independently verify Russia’s claim that a weapons depot had been destroyed.

Ian Williams, deputy director of the missile defense project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said he was nearly positive the videos showed the launch of 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles.

“These are Russia’s long-range naval sea-based cruise missiles, similar to the U.S. Tomahawk,” he told The Post in an email. “They use satellite navigation along with some onboard inertial guidance.”

“This was almost certainly launched by the Russian Black Sea Fleet,” Mark Cancian, senior adviser for the international security program at CSIS, said in an email. Kalibr missiles are “at the high end of Russian capabilities,” he added. “Russia uses them to attack the highest priority targets. They seem to be doing more of that in western Ukraine. It may be part of an effort to attack strategic targets, that is, targets that matter in the long war.”

The 3M-14 or SS-N-30A cruise missile , commonly referred to as the Kalibr missile, can be fired from ships or submarines toward land targets. It can travel a maximum range of about 1,550 miles, according to the CSIS Missile Defense Project.

The missiles, designed to penetrate the air defenses of stationary ground targets, fly autonomously and largely horizontally at low altitude, along preprogrammed waypoints. Their route can be updated midcourse via satellite communication. Cruise missiles can be highly accurate compared to ballistic missiles.

The standard 3M14T land-attack missile reportedly contains a nearly 1,000-pound high explosive warhead. It is often used to attack storage facilities, command posts, seaports and airports.

Russia stuck barracks in the southern port city of Mykolaiv with a Kalibr missile earlier this month, the New York Times reported , killing at least eight Ukrainian soldiers who had been sleeping there. The region’s governor said at least 19 others were wounded.

A Pentagon official said at a background briefing Wednesday that the United States still assessed that Russia has “the vast majority” of its inventory of surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles.

Russia first used the SS-N-30A Kalibr missile in Syria in October 2015, when it launched 26 missiles from Russian naval vessels in the Caspian Sea, at forces fighting the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Dan Lamothe contributed to this report.

Ukraine says Russia Kalibr missile cargo hit in transit to Crimea

Ukraine says shipment of Russian Kalibr cruise missiles was destroyed in transit to the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.

Ukraine has reported the destruction of “multiple” Russian cruise missiles as they were being transported by rail to Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Crimea.

Ukraine’s military agency said late on Monday that multiple Kalibr cruise missiles were destroyed by an explosion, without explicitly saying Ukraine was responsible for the blast or exactly how the shipment of powerful missiles was destroyed.

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“An explosion in Dzhankoi city in the north of temporarily occupied Crimea destroyed Russian Kalibr-KN cruise missiles as they were being transported by rail,” Ukraine’s intelligence agency said in social media posts. The missiles were destined for submarine launch by the Russian Black Sea fleet, the agency said.

Ihor Ivin, the Russian-installed head of the Dzhankoi administration, was quoted as saying the city had come under attack from drones and a 33-year-old man suffered a shrapnel injury from a downed drone.

He was hospitalized and was expected to survive. A house, school and grocery store caught fire, and the power grid also sustained damage in the attack, Russia’s state-owned news agency TASS quoted Ivin as saying on the local Krym-24 TV channel.

The Russian-appointed governor of Crimea, Sergei Aksenov, said on social media that anti-aircraft weapons were fired in the vicinity of Dzhankoi, where Ukraine’s intelligence agency said the cruise missiles were destroyed. Aksenov said falling debris injured one person and damaged a home as well as a store.

Russian officials did not confirm that missiles were destroyed in the attack. Ukrainian media reported that the sound of drone engines was heard before the explosion in Dzhankoi.

Kalibr cruise missiles have been used frequently in Russian attacks on Ukraine. In July 2022, a submarine-launched Kalibr cruise missile killed 23 civilians — including three children — in the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia. Russia claimed the missile was directed at a meeting of Ukrainian air force commanders and representatives of Western arms suppliers.

Sounds of the drones that hit Dzhankoy in occupied Crimea are similar to those of the Iranian Shahed-136/131 drones. Some sources speculate that Shaheds were retargeted to Crimea-based targets. More likely, Ukraine has developed drones with similar engines. 📹via @RoksolanaKrim pic.twitter.com/djmDckWpKz — Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) March 20, 2023

While reports of attacks on Russian military bases, assassinations and other targets in Crimea have featured regularly throughout the war, Ukraine has rarely, if ever, explicitly claimed responsibility for such attacks but does welcome their outcome.

The reported destruction of the shipment of cruise missiles in Crimea follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the peninsula on Saturday in an unannounced tour to mark the ninth anniversary of the region’s annexation from Ukraine.

Putin made the trip the day after the International Criminal Court (ICC) said it had issued an arrest warrant for his arrest on suspicion of war crimes for illegally deporting hundreds of children from Ukraine. The court, based in The Hague, Netherlands, also issued a warrant for the arrest of Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights. Russia claims the deportation of children from Ukraine is a humanitarian act.

The ICC warrants were immediately dismissed by Moscow as outrageous and welcomed by Ukraine as a major breakthrough in pursuing justice for the victims of Russian war crimes.

In a precursor to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, Moscow seized Crimea in 2014, then annexed the peninsula in a move many countries condemned as illegal.

Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy has promised to recapture all the Ukrainian land that Russia now occupies, including Crimea.

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• 3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A)

Russia’s Kalibr cruise missiles are believed to be the land-attack version the Klub family cruise missiles, yet, not much is currently known about these variations. The 3M-14T Kalibr-NK is a land-attack cruise missile carried by Russia’s surface vessels. Reports put its max range at 1,500 – 2,500 km. In October and November 2015, Russia launched a salvo of Kalibr missiles from the Caspian Sea at ISIS targets inside Syria. The Kalibr-NK cruise missiles were launched from a Russian Gepard-class frigate and Buyan-M-class corvettes and travelled 1,500 km to reach their targets. It has been reported it is capable of carrying a 450 kg conventional or (reported) nuclear warhead.

The missile is believed to fly 64 ft above the sea and 164 ft above the ground at speeds up to 965 km/hour. It is believed to be guided, using GPS and terminal-phase active radar seekers to achieve a reported three m CEP. The 3M-14K Kalibr-PL is similar to the 3M-14T except that is launched from a submarine. This variant was reported to have been launched from an improved Kilo-class submarine in the Mediterranean to strike targets inside Syria in December 2015. Russia plans to equip most of its submarines and surface ships with the respective versions of the Klub anti-ship and Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles. This will include ships in Russia’s Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Northern, and Pacific Fleets. Novator Design Bureau, the designers of the Klub launch system, have developed a shipping container version of the launcher, capable of holding up to four missiles. This shipping container version allows the cruise missile to be forward deployed on ships, trucks, and trains without detection.

Strategic Implications

The Russian plan to equip its submarines and surface ships with the Kalibr cruise missile poses a serious threat to the U.S. ability to project force across the globe. The Russian ships that carried out the 2015 strike all had a displacement around or under 1,000 tons.  The 26 Kalibr missiles reportedly traveled 1,800 km, a significant distance for missiles launched from such small vessels. The small size of the Russian ships that carried out the strike offers them unique strategic opportunities, not to mention the fact that these naval vessels are relatively inexpensive. Despite significant Russian ground assets in Syria capable of carrying out such a strike, Russia elected to demonstrate its improvement with a longer-range sea-based launch. According to a U.S. official, this was done intentionally to display these enhanced capabilities. Beyond the immediate ramifications of the Russian strike on Syria with Kalibr cruise missiles, the strike showed that Russia has potentially strengthened its A2/AD capabilities to further limit US military operations in contested regions, which, in turn, will allow Russia to continue conducting hybrid warfare tactics and to punch above its own weight militarily.

Cavas, Christopher P. “Is Caspian Sea Fleet a Game-Changer.” Defense News . October 11, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/10/11/caspian-sea-russia-navy-missiles-attack-strike-military-naval-syria-frigate-corvette-lcs-littoral-combat-ship/73671188/

Lewis, Jeffrey. “Sokov on Russian Cruise Missiles.”  Arms Control Wonk . August 25, 2015. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207801/sokov-on-russian-cruise-missiles/.

Akulov, Andrei. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game.”  Strategic Culture Foundation.  May 24, 2016. http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html.

Johnson, Richard. “How Russia fired missiles at Syria from 1,000 miles away.”  The Washington Post . October 23, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/russian-cruise-missile/.

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Russia deploys three submarines armed with cruise missiles to sea for the first time

According to ukrainian navy spokesmen dmytro pletenchuk, russian navy deployed three submarines armed with cruise missiles at the same time. he posted the news on social media..

Tomasz Grotnik 30 Jul 2024

Pletenchuk mentioned that “all submarines are in the Azov-Black Sea region,” and that two of them were spotted in the Black Sea on July 29. He added ironically that “sometimes the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is called a submarine, and now it looks like this is true.”

Surface forces in retreat

The fact is that the activities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s surface forces have been marginalized in the face of the risk of damage or even destruction. As a result of kamikaze drone attacks (e.g., Magura V5 or newer), Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles, ATACMS ballistic missiles or anti-ship missiles, several valuable vessels were sunk or put out of action for a long time. This caused the withdrawal of the most important ships from the naval base in Sevastopol, which were directed to Novorossiysk and ports in the Sea of Azov.

Also, ships being built or outfitted at the Shipyard Butomy (formerly Zaliv) in Kerch in seized Crimea are being towed to the Baltic for completion and sea trials. This comes on the heels of the successful attack on the missile ship (corvette) Askold of project 22800 Karakurt at the Zaliv shipyard in November 2023. More recently, on July 25, the patrol ship Viktor Velikiy of project 22160 arrived in St. Petersburg. It is the fifth vessel of its class built in Zelonodolsk, Tatarstan, but equipped in Crimea. The ship was diverted to the Baltic Sea for safety reasons.

The Russians have already lost OPV of this class. On March 5, a Ukrainian drone sank the patrol ship Sergey Kotov in the Kerch area. The Black Sea has not been a safe place for Russian surface forces for a long time. Recently, Russian ships have even been spotted in the Caspian Sea, where they have made their way from the Black Sea to complete sea trials safely before entering service. The vessels in question are two new Karakurts, the Amur and the Tucha .

The Russians have no concept of solving the problem of their surface fleet in the face of Ukraine’s asymmetric response. In these realities, it is not surprising that they are trying to exploit the potential of their submarines. Currently, Ukraine does not have the technical means to detect and destroy submerged submarines, so their actions will go unpunished. The problem is that Russian submarines in the Black Sea are firing cruise missiles against targets in Ukraine.

Submarines with cruise missiles in war against Ukraine

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has six Project 636.3 Varshavyanka (NATO: Improved Kilo) submarines, which belong to the 4th Independent Submarine Brigade. One of them – the B-237 Rostov-on-Don – was severely damaged in September 2023 by a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missile fired from a Ukrainian Su-24 tactical bomber. Two others were operating in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war and did not make it back to the Black Sea. They are the B-261 Novorossiysk and the B-265 Krasnodar . Currently, one of them – Krasnodar – is in the Baltic Sea. Thus, in the Black Sea the Russians have three Improved Kilos.

The Kilos are armed with six 533mm launchers. They are used to launch heavyweight torpedoes, 3M54 anti-ship missiles, 3M14 cruise missiles and laying bottom mines. Each Varshavyanka can take between 4 and 8 (sources give different figures) 3M14 missiles of the Kalibr-PL system with a range of more than 2,000 km.

In addition to them, there is another submarine – B-871 Alrosa – of project 877W Paltus (Kilo). It’s a pump-jet propulsor test platform, but in mid-2022 Alrosa completed an overhaul and modernization. Submarine was reportedly integrated with the Kalibr-PL system during its course.

On July 28, during a celebration of the Russian Navy Day, it’s spokesman reported that the Black Sea Fleet’s surface ships and submarines destroyed over 200 targets in Ukraine with Kalibr missiles during this war. It is unclear whether this is true, as the Ukrainians claim to have shot down most of the cruise missiles (airborne X-101 and naval Kalibr).

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Russia has problems with Kalibr missiles: British intelligence explains

R ussia is having problems using Kalibr cruise missiles. The reason for this is logistics, reveals the British Defense Ministry on X.

It is noted that the ability of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to use its base in Novorossiysk to reload ships with cruise missiles is likely to become a significant factor in the operational effectiveness of the fleet.

Traditionally, the Russian occupiers reloaded their cruise missiles in Sevastopol. But now it has become dangerous due to Ukrainian attacks. British intelligence believes that Russia will rely more on Novorossiysk.

However, there is a possibility that Russia has stopped using Kalibr because of logistical problems in Novorossiysk.

"Russia will likely seek to expedite overcoming such issues in time for maritime cruise missiles to be included in any winter campaign of strikes against Ukraine," the report reads.

Russia is preparing attacks

Ukrainians are being warned about possible new massive shelling by the occupiers on the eve of winter. The Russians may target Ukraine's energy sector.

Ukrainian intelligence believes that the occupiers are preparing for attacks and stockpiling missiles. According to the Air Force, the Russians could have accumulated up to 900 long-range precision missiles before winter.

At the same time, the military emphasizes that winter in Ukraine should be easier than last year. In particular, because of Ukraine's preparations and the fact that the Russians no longer have the resources they had at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

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Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Russian offensive campaign assessment, august 21, 2024.

  Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout the Kursk Oblast salient on August 21 and have made additional marginal advances. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces posted footage on August 21 showing Ukrainian strikes on several pontoon bridges and staging areas along the Seim River in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. [13] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces suggested that Ukrainian forces may have used HIMARS in some of the strikes against pontoon bridges, while milbloggers speculated that Ukrainian forces used air-launched small-diameter glide bombs. [14] Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows drone operators of Russia's 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) striking Ukrainian forces in and around Vishnevka (south of Koreveno and 14km from the international border), confirming that Ukrainian forces have likely advanced into and beyond the settlement. [15] A Russian milblogger claimed that a reinforced platoon-sized Ukrainian element unsuccessfully attacked from Vishnevka towards Komarovka (southwest of Koreveno and 12km from the international border), but that Russian drone strikes and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) fire stopped Ukrainian forces from establishing positions within Komarovka. [16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a platoon-sized mechanized attack towards Korenevo but were unsuccessful. [17] Additional geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in forest areas east of Aleksandrovka (northeast of Koreveno and 33km from the international border). [18] Geolocated footage published on August 21 also shows that elements of the Russian 200th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) hold positions along the 38H-564 road east of Zhuravli (east of Koreveno and 21km from the international border), indicating that Russian forces either recently retook these positions or that Ukrainian forces have not yet closed the small salient along the 38H-564 road near Zhuravli. [19] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and are encircling Russian forces in Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha and 19km from the international border). [20] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly facing encirclement in Martynovka, and Russian milbloggers lauded a soldier from the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade for allegedly leading conscripts out of an encirclement in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast, potentially in reference to the Martynovka pocket. [21] Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced into southern Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha and 12km from the international border). [22] The Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade appears to be deployed particularly sporadically throughout the Kursk Oblast salient — various Russian sources have reported that its elements are operating as far north as the Kauchuk area (30km from the international border) and between Martynovka and Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha and 45km away from Kauchuk). [23]

  Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing maintaining the initiative in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
• Putin notably appears to be demanding that Russia defeat Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast without sacrificing the stability of his regime, deprioritizing the offensive in eastern Ukraine, or firing his incompetent but loyal lieutenants. The results of such a strategy are too early to forecast.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout the Kursk Oblast salient on August 21 and have made additional marginal advances.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of Chechnya for the first time in 13 years on August 20, likely in an effort to shift domestic focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and posture normalcy and stability.
• Recent US intelligence assessments highlight Ukraine's efforts to develop alternative and asymmetric capabilities in the face of Russian manpower and materiel advantages, as well as Ukraine's continued dependence on Western security assistance.
• Ukraine continues efforts to attrit Russia's air defense and aviation capabilities.
• Russian authorities may have attempted to block Telegram and other non-Russian internet communications services on August 21.
• The Russian government is reportedly supporting a bill that would allow Russian authorities to draw up administrative protocols against Russian citizens who violate Russian law while living aboard.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Qiang discussed deepening bilateral economic and trade relations in Moscow on August 21.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and northeast of Robotyne.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to create Cossack organizations in occupied Ukraine, likely to build out Russia's military reserves and law enforcement bodies in occupied Ukraine.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Limited positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev noted that Russian forces have decreased their use of tactical aviation targeting Kharkiv Oblast in order to prioritize airstrikes in other areas of the theater and in Kursk Oblast. [57] Sarantsev also reported that a contingent of Russian forces remains blocked in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but that they are unable to attack their way out of the plant because Ukrainian forces control all logistics routes into and out of the plant. [58] Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and in and around Vovchansk. [59] Elements of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) reportedly continue operating near Hlyboke and Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv City and east of Hlyboke), respectively. [60]

Limited positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Berestove; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Serhiivka and Novoserhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Makiivka, Hrekivka, and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova on August 20 and 21. [61] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction (west of Kreminna). [62]

Russian forces did not make confirmed advances in the Chasiv Yar direction amid ongoing offensive operations on August 20 and 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and Klishchiivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 20 and 21. [64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces consolidated their positions in the forest south of Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar) in an area up to 2.36 kilometers wide and that elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continued operating near Hryhorivka. [65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [66]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed on August 21 that Russian forces seized Niu York (south of Toretsk), but Ukrainian military sources continue to report that Ukrainian forces still control 20 percent of the settlement. [67] Belousov credited elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) for the seizure of Niu York. [68] A source from a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the situation in Niu York is very difficult because Russian forces are constantly attacking the settlement in small assault groups but that Ukrainian forces still control about 20 percent of Niu York. [69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields northeast of Druzhba (east of Toretsk); in northwestern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk); and in eastern Toretsk. [70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched assaults near Toretsk; southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne; south of Toretsk near Nelipivka and Niu York; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on August 20 and 21. [71] Belousov claimed on August 20 that elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1st Slavic Brigade (both 1st DNR AC) seized Zalizne. [72]

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and continued offensive operations in this direction on August 20 and 21. Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Zhuravka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and some Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Zhuravka. [73] ISW had not observed visual evidence confirming Russian advances in the northwesternmost part of Zhuravka, nor to suggest that Russian forces control the entire settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Hrodivka (east of Porkrovsk) and northeast of Novohrodivka, south of Mykolaivka, and north of Ptyche (all southeast of Pokrovsk). [74] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Komyshivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence confirming these milblogger claims. [75] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) retroactively announced on August 21 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) seized Zhelanne, and ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized Zhelanne around August 18. [76] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, Myrolyubivka, Hrodivka, and Kalynove; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Mykolaivka, Novohrodivka, Mykhailivka, Ptyche, and Skuchne. [77] Elements of the Russian BARS-15 unit (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction, and a drone company of the ”Volga” Brigade is reportedly operating near Novohrodivka. [78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka on August 20 and 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. [79]

Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Russian forces have recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast to the southern outskirts of Luhivske (northeast of Robotyne). [85] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing for offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast, with one milblogger claiming on the evening of August 20 that Ukrainian forces launched an offensive operation near Polohy (in central Zaporizhia Oblast east of Robotyne). [86] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin and several milbloggers denied claims of Ukrainian activation anywhere in Zaporizhia Oblast, however, and accused other Russian commentators of overhyping false information and creating panic in the information space. [87] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on August 20 and 21. [88] Elements of BARS-32 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating near Enerhodar (west of Robotyne), while elements of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and BARS-3 are operating in the general Zaporizhia Oblast direction. [89]

Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on August 20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. [90] Russian forces conducted drone, artillery, and air strikes against settlements and civilian infrastructure in west bank Kherson Oblast. [91]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to find ways to incorporate US-produced electronic components into its weapons and censorship, and surveillance systems. Russian investigative outlet The Insider published a story on August 20 detailing how Russia is importing programmable logic devices (PLDs) for use in missile and drone navigation systems, internet content filtration, and facial recognition, many of which come from US companies. [101] The Insider noted that Russia is using Xilex and Altera integrated circuits, both products of American PLD manufacturers, in the navigation systems for Iskander and Kalibr missiles. The Insider also emphasized that Russia is able to import such PLDs despite extensive international sanctions, largely because many export companies are ignoring international embargoes.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/v-kremle-schitayut-chto-boi-v-kurskoy-oblasti-prodlyatsya-neskolko-mesyatsev-i-hotyat-ubedit-rossiyan-chto-eto-novaya-normalnost

[2] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/21/7471267/

[3] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/21/7471267/; https://t.me/cikrossii/3944

[4] https://meduza dot io/paragraph/2024/08/21/kursk-ne-slomit-kak-v-geroicheskom-1943-m-my-vse-ot-hipsterov-do-vatnikov-dolzhny-ob-edinitsya

[5] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/180564

[6] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/v-kremle-schitayut-chto-boi-v-kurskoy-oblasti-prodlyatsya-neskolko-mesyatsev-i-hotyat-ubedit-rossiyan-chto-eto-novaya-normalnost

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/assessing-significance-current-russian-and-ukrainian-operations-course-war

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[9] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/v-kremle-schitayut-chto-boi-v-kurskoy-oblasti-prodlyatsya-neskolko-mesyatsev-i-hotyat-ubedit-rossiyan-chto-eto-novaya-normalnost

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2024

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023

[13] https://t.me/ukr_sof/1183; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9623 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19046 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/180535 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1826175406610829766

[14] https://t.me/ukr_sof/1183; https://t.me/motopatriot/26477

[15] https://t.me/VARYAGI_155/105 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1826198757483896954 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1826222767802351867 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1826225646197952718 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1826233665426456948 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1826236574507679841; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1826214202534437305; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6464

[16] https://t.me/rusich_army/16657

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/50276

[18] https://t.me/morpexiMO/6306 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1826200674851344588 ; https://x.com/GNovosibir79446/status/1826192342170189845; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1826202988295127510; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1826202992103539130; https://t.me/morpexiMO/6306; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6462

[19] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1826296192013304096; https://t.me/khornegroup/2556

[20] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14331; https://t.me/motopatriot/26459; https://t.me/motopatriot/26447; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58401; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1260

[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/50306 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75284 ; https://t.me/s/NgP_raZVedka ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134360 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19905

[22] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1826295667318280343; https://t.me/rusich_army/16669

[23] https://t.me/astrapress/62346 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50306; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1825990685901615544 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50231; https://t.me/control_sigma/33709 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14319

[24] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74906

[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74904

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar103023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024

[27] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74904

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081424

[29] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Aug/16/2003527561/-1/-1/1/OAR_Q3_JUN2024_FINAL_508.PDF

[30] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Aug/16/2003527561/-1/-1/1/OAR_Q3_JUN2024_FINAL_508.PDF

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041924 ; https://www.ft.com/content/daa1a6ad-9ada-42ba-bfb2-2c199118e904 ; https://archive.ph/7LGbR

[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724

[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121623 ;

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024

[35] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Aug/16/2003527561/-1/-1/1/OAR_Q3_JUN2024_FINAL_508.PDF

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024

[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072024

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xJoc2FgD5hUcErqdGSmku86d2jBJSLAp22DNCGhaDHtvNVkjW5hVySfgxy9PRMbJl

[41] h ttps://t.me/andriyshTime/26252 ; https://t.me/vrogov/17127 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1826251220308430880 ; https://vk.com/wall-90644414_39836 ; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1494 ; https://t.me/golubev_vu/1495 ; https://t.me/etorostov/62864 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/50118

[42] https://t.me/rybar/62951

[43] https://t.me/sotaproject/85660 ; https://t.me/astrapress/62407; https://t.me/milinfolive/128915

[44] https://t.me/VGrudina/2794 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1826270072307855362 https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1826292246460711184 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1826270127722996150; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58419 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58417 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/128912%20;%20https:/t.me/milinfolive/128915

[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/267622 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/85664

[46] https://t.me/milinfolive/128915 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/50145 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/08/21/glava-murmanskoy-oblasti-zayavil-ob-ugroze-bespilotnikov-v-regione-mestnyy-aeroport-vremenno-zakryli

[47] https://suspilne dot media/800159-droni-gur-atakuvali-npz-vijskovi-aerodromi-rf-i-poskodili-nadzvukovij-bombarduvalnik-dzerela/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/27/chorni-dni-rosijskoyi-aviacziyi-detali-atak-na-obyekty-v-tylu-rf/

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/267588 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/267597 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/v-rossii-perestali-otkryvatsya-telegram-whatsapp-steam-discord-i-mnogie-drugie-servisy-chto-proishodit-neponyatno

[49] https://t.me/tass_agency/267601

[50] https://t.me/agentstvonews/7046

[51] https://meduza dot io/short/2020/06/18/dva-goda-popytok-blokirovki-telegram-v-rossii-kak-eto-bylo

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2023

[53] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6905653 ; https://www.vesti dot ru/article/4103600; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/08/21/vlasti-smogut-privlekat-uehavshih-rossiyan-po-politicheskim-statyam-koap-a-razve-ranshe-ne-privlekali-ili-teper-oni-budut-delat-eto-chasche

[54] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74910

[55] https://t.me/tass_agency/267576

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/267528

[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/21/na-harkivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zmenshyly-zastosuvannya-taktychnoyi-aviacziyi/

[58] https://suspilne dot media/817997-zsu-kontroluut-93-naseleni-punkti-v-kurskij-oblasti-trivae-evakuacia-z-pokrovska-910-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1724252042&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/21/v-otu-harkiv-rozpovily-pro-stanovyshhe-okupantiv-na-agregatnomu-zavodu-u-vovchansku/

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://t.me/wargonzo/21670

[60] https://t.me/otukharkiv/841

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l

[62] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17012

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75309; https://t.me/voin_dv/10389

[66] https://t [dot] me/motopatriot/26441

[67] https://t.me/mod_russia/42426 ; https://suspilne dot media/817997-zsu-kontroluut-93-naseleni-punkti-v-kurskij-oblasti-trivae-evakuacia-z-pokrovska-910-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1724242209&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/42426

[69] https://suspilne dot media/817997-zsu-kontroluut-93-naseleni-punkti-v-kurskij-oblasti-trivae-evakuacia-z-pokrovska-910-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1724242209&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[70] https://t [dot] me/z_arhiv/27719; https://t.me/rybar/62934 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75309; https://t.me/dva_majors/50276; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134415

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/42396

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/50276 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/26417; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75278

[74] https://t [dot] me/z_arhiv/27717; https://t [dot] me/boris_rozhin/134415; https://t [dot] me/z_arhiv/27715; https://t [dot] me/motopatriot/26443; https://t [dot] me/boris_rozhin/134415

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/75281 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14318; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134415

[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/42412 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2024

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl

[78] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12923 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58405 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/26423

[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21670 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58402

[80] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1826153970517029174; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1826174132343517470; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1826188895937020218; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6461 ; https://t.me/odshbr79/304; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6452

[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14324 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134415 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27713

[82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mbcfj2CsF4Zev5JUw6tqFFzHABZsE9uVBhz9tSKev7YcfT8NvQUYajTna6B7vAUQl

[83] https://t.me/motopatriot/26456

[84] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2024

[85] https://t.me/operativnoZSU/154906; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6459

[86] https://t.me/romanov_92/45062; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14310; https://t.me/sashakots/48517; https://t.me/sashakots/48517

[87] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6326; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18763 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18762; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18765; https://t.me/dva_majors/50271 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/45062

[88] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11036

[89] https://t.me/orly_rs/5549;

[90] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KwX54hpu7qM9kdUS9qLQhEGJavR3XHNSBMNzsBeoh6Q6oH644FBij6cnaZVo2Cssl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F1pqeXSUWGYRQ1xdb5t2uwAyf9GudeWCy3oNHFZvP775hNmxQpgwqVTfYVPgbnD6l; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11036

[91] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23489; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/4265; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23488; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23482; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23468; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23467; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/23459; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/4268

[92] https://t.me/ComAFUA/393

[93] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/7492

[94] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3765

[95] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/4063

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024

[97] https://t.me/voenkom_on_line/410 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2024

[98] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2024

[99] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/5479 ; https://verstka dot media/chistki-v-minoborony-50-uvoleno

[100] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/977489

[101] https://theins dot ru/obshestvo/273811

[102] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4274; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/08/21/operacziyi-proty-ukrayinskyh-bizhencziv-u-yevropi-gotuye-rf-gur/

[103] https://t.me/tass_agency/267509 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/50281 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/523 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/19

[104] https://t.me/tass_agency/267567

[105] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924

[106] https://t.me/modmilby/41217

[107] https://t.me/pul_1/13409

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Kalibr cruise missile launched by Russian Navy against Ukraine enters airspace of Romania .

According to information published on its Twitter account, on February 10, 2023, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, reported that two Kalibr cruise missiles launched by Russian navy ships against Ukraine entered the airspace of Romania. Follow Navy Recognition on Google News at this link

Citing the Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, on February 10, 2023, Russian armed forces launched massive missile attacks on the Ukrainian territory including 71 Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, up to 35 S-300 surface-to-air missiles as well as 7 Shahed kamikaze drones.

The Ukrainian air defense forces shot down 61 cruise missiles and 5 drones. Reporting information from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Kalibr missiles were launched by Russian navy ships deployed in the Black Sea.

Kalibr cruise missiles have been widely used by Russian forces since the beginning of the War in Ukraine, and the invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. The invasion started with the launching of 30 cruise missiles, targetting command and control points, air bases, and air-defense batteries. The missiles were likely fired by the Buyan-class corvettes, Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, and Kilo-class submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

On January 21, 2023, eleven vessels of the Russian navy were deployed in the Black Sea, including five ships able to fire Kalibr cruise missiles, according to information published by the Ukrainian navy intelligence services.

The core of Russia’s conventional long-range strike capabilities are provided by air and sea-launched cruise missiles, namely, the Kh-50, AS-23A/B (Kh-101/Kh-102), and SS-N-30 Kalibr with firing ranges of 1,500, 4,500 and 2,000 km respectively.

An enlarged derivative of the Kalibr, the Kalibr-M, is also under development and will feature an increased range of 4,500 km, and due to enter service in the mid-2020s.15 It will equip surface ships and submarines, with a ground-launched variant also under development.

Kalibr (NATO reporting name: SS-N-27 Sizzler) is a Russian cruise missile engineered and produced by the Yekaterinburg-based Novator Design Bureau (part of Almaz-Antey defense manufacturer). The Russian armed forces currently operate shipborne Kalibr-NK and submarine-launched Kalibr-PL missile modifications.

The Kalibr can be launched from a surface ship using a Vertical Launching System (VLS) or by submarines using torpedo tubes. The range of the Kalibr against ground targets (as of 2012) is 2,600 km, and against sea targets, the range is 375 km. According to other reports, the 3M14 has a range of 2,000 to 2,600 km with thermonuclear warheads.

The Kalibr cruise missile can be armed with a fragmentation-fuzed or penetrating high explosive warhead with TNT equivalent of 200-450 kg, or a tactical thermonuclear warhead of 50 kt.

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